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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FLORIDA
L. L. FArsmsI AND JOE A. CowAnT, JR.
The early English chancellor, almost always an ecclesiastic and
student of the civil law, found in Roman law a body of principles
adapted to guide him in his effort to fill the gaps in, and to soften the
rigors of, the early common law. Among other things he found the
interdict, defined as follows in the Institutes:'
"erant autem interdicta formae atque conceptiones verborum,
quibus praetoraut iubebat aliquid fieri aut fieri prohibebat....
".... prohibitoriasunt, quibus vetat aliquid fiere, veluti vim
sine vitio possidenti, vel mortuum inferenti, quo ei ius erit
inferendi, vel in loco sacro aedificari, vel in flumine publico
ripave eius aliquid fieri, quo peius navigetur, restitutoria sunt,
quibus restitui aliquid iubet ....
This is the very definition used by an early American author who
described injunction as "a judicial process, whereby a party is
required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular
thing, according to the exigency of the writ."2
Although injunction is not one of the traditional common law
extraordinary writs,3 it stands forth as a distinct head of equity jurisprudence and perhaps the most important of the equitable processes.
It is frequently termed the strong arm of equity and, like the writ of
habeas corpus, is to be granted cautiously and sparingly, 4 lest it be
1INsrrroPTs 4.15.pr: "Interdicts were formulae by which the praetor either
ordered or forbade something to be done....
"... Prohibitory interdicts are those by which he forbids some act, such as forcibly ejecting a bona fide possessor, or forcibly interfering with interment in a lawful
place, or building upon sacred ground, or doing anything in a public stream or on
its banks that will impede navigation. Restitutory interdicts are those by which
he orders that something be restored...." Cf. GArus 4.138.
22 SToRY, Com EnTmras~ s oN EQurr JuwIsPRuDENcE §861 (13th ed. 1886).
The Supreme Court of Florida has stated that it is established law in Florida
that a writ of injunction is an extraordinary writ, Clark v. Kreidt, 145 Fla. 1,
199 So. 833 (1940).
4
Johnson v. Killian, 157 Fla. 754, 27 So.2d 845 (1946); Willis v. Hathaway,

95 Fla. 608, 117 So. 89 (1928).
[571]
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turned into an instrument of oppression and injury. 5 The issuing of
an injunction has always called forth strong statements of caution by
eminent judges. Thus Judge Baldwin in Bonaparte v. Camden &
A.R.R. 6 said, 'There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing an
injunction ...."
The reason for caution is evident. In many applications for injunction the court is obliged to act on ex parte affidavits that, if they
do not positively misstate the facts, may give a very inadequate view
of them. So impressed are the English equity judges with the necessity of discouraging one-sided statements that if the ex parte presentation of the case is not fair they will dismiss the application without
7
regard to its merits.
I.

OBJECr AND PURPOSE OF INJUNCTIONS GENERALLY

The object and purpose of an injunction is to preserve an existing
state or condition and to restrain an act which if done would be
contrary to equity and good conscience. It is the appropriate relief
if the remedy at law is available only subsequent to the injury and
the effects cannot at that time be adequately compensated. 8 Since it
is well settled in this state that injunction is preventive only9 and
ordinarily cannot be applied correctively,' 0 injunction will not issue
12
if the acts complained of are past" and not continuous in nature
5
Clark v. Kreidt, 145 Fla. 1, 199 So. 333 (1940); Savage v. Parker, 53 Fla.
1002, 43 So. 507 (1907); Godwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So. 597 (1906).
63 Fed. Cas. No. 1,617, at 827 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830).
7
Wigram, V. C., in Castelli v. Cook, 7 Hare 89, 94, 68 Eng. Rep. 36, 38
(Ch. 1849), said: "The rule, as I understand it, is this: that a Plaintiff applying
ex parte comes (as it has been expressed) under a contract with the Court that
he will state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court. If he fails to do
that, and the Court finds, when the other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material fact has been suppressed or not properly brought forward,
the Plaintiff is told that the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as
he has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go."
SPensacola & G. Ry. v. Spratt, 12 Fla. 26, 91 Am. Dec. 747 (1867).
9
Smith v. Davis, 22 Fla. 405 (1886).
'0Godwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So. 597 (1906).
"1Davis v. Wilson, 139 Fla. 698, 190 So. 716 (1939); Wilkinson v. Woodward,
105 Fla. 376, 141 So. 313 (1932); Drew Lumber Co. v. Union Inv. Co., 66 Fla.
382, 63 So. 836 (1913).
12 Smith v. Davis, 22 Fla. 405 (1886).
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and there is no showing of reasonable probability that such conduct
will continue. 3 Thus an injunction to restrain the holding of an
election has been denied when the date fixed for the election passed
before the determination of the suit to restrain. 14
When a party seeks the aid of a court of equity by injunction, he
must show not only clear legal or equitable right but also a wellgrounded apprehension of immediate injury.'5 The Florida Court
has said, "To make out a case for an injunction, it must appear that
there is at least a reasonable probability, not a bare possibility, that
a real injury wiUl occur if the writ is not granted."16 If the special
and peculiar injury apprehended is doubtful of occurrence, the relief
is generally withheld.17
II. CrSS IsmcgoNs, Dis-wr

noNs AiN DEFINrmoNs

Injunctions may be classified as prohibitory and mandatory. A
prohibitory, sometimes called preventive, injunction is one that
operates to restrain the commission or continuance of an act and to
prevent a threatened injury. A mandatory injunction commands acts
to be done or undone, and hence may require the performance of
some affirmative acts.'
Injunctions are also classified according to their duration or
permanency as follows: (1) restraining orders, which are usually
granted without notice to the opposite party and are intended only
as a restraint on the defendant until the hearing on an application for
a temporary injunction; (2) temporary injunctions, which are provisional remedies obtainable before hearing on the merits; and (3)
permanent injunctions, which issue only after process and a final
'Sjacksonville v. Wilson, 157 Fla. 838, 27 So.2d 108 (1946); Seaboard A.L.
Ry. v. Southern Inv. Co., 53 Fla. 832, 44 So. 351 (1907).
14McKinney v. County Comm'rs, 26 Fla. 267, 3 So. 887 (1888); accord, Smith
v. Davis, 22 Fla. 405 (1886) (affirming the denial of an injunction without considering the merits because the sale sought to be enjoined had occurred prior
to appeal).
' 5 Crawford v. Bradford, 23 Fla. 404, 2 So. 782 (1887).
" 6Davis v. Wilson, 139 Fla. 698, 705, 190 So. 716, 719 (1939); accord,
Farmers' State Bank v. Board of Comm'rs, 295 Fed. 755 (S.D. Fla. 1920); Ruge
v. Apalachicola Oyster Canning & Fish Co., 25 Fla. 656, 6 So. 489 (1889).
' 7 Hemandez v. Board of Comm'rs, 114 Fla. 219, 153 So. 790 (1934); Ruge
v. Apalachicola Oyster Canning & Fish Co., 25 Fla. 656, 6 So. 489 (1889).
18 Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, 89 Fla. 253, 103 So. 625 (1925).
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hearing on the merits and are usually perpetual in effect. 9
Our Court has occasionally mentioned, collectively, "temporary
restraining order and interlocutory injunction," 20 and, disjunctively,
"temporary injunction or restraining order," 2 1 and at times each individually,2 2 but has never made a distinction between the two. The
terms and conditions of a temporary injunction are so completely
under the control of the judge issuing it that the one can be made to
serve the purpose of the other without distinction. In addition, a
restraining order is given by statute the same effect as an injunction.2 3
Certainly in popular practice among lawyers the terms are used interchangeably. The authors of this article have accordingly treated the
two terms as synonymous.
Temporary Injunction
The purpose of a temporary injunction is the maintenance of the
subject matter in statu quo pending the determination of the cause.
As the name implies, such an order is not conclusive, and its provisions may be merged in, modified, or dissolved by or before the final
24
decree.
Since the object of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status
quo, the court will not grant such an order when its effect would be
to change the status. Thus it is erroneous to restrain the defendant
from interfering with prospective acts of the plaintiff if the effect of a
temporary injunction will be to destroy the existing condition of the
subject matter of the suit before the final determination of the plaintiffs right to such relief.
19Injunctions are properly classified as follows:
1. Restraining orders.

2. Temporary injunctions (often called preliminary, interlocutory, or injunction pendente lite).
3. Permanent injunctions (often called final or perpetual injunctions).

Both temporary and permanent injunctions may be mandatory in form.
20
See, e.g., Merryman v. Southern Tours, 120 Fla. 440, 445, 162 So. 897, 899
(1935).
21See, e.g., B.L.E. Realty Corp. v. Mary Williams Co., 101 Fla. 254, 258, 134
So. 47, 50 (1931).
22
E.g., Strong v. Clay, 47 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1950); Thursby v. Stewart, 103

Fla. 990, 138 So. 742 (1931).
23

FLA. STAT.

§63.73 (1949).

24Smith v. Housing Authority, 148 Fla. 195, 3 So.2d 880 (1941); Schultz v.
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The status quo which will be preserved by temporary injunction is
the last actual, peaceable, noncontested condition which preceded the
pending controversy. If the defendant wrongfully changes the condition of things before the granting of the injunction, the court may
not only restrain further action by him but may also, by temporary
mandatory injunction, compel him to restore the subject matter of the
suit to its former condition. In so doing the court acts without any
regard to the ultimate merits of the controversy. 25 Temporary injunctions are often used to protect property from interference and
molestation,2 8 to prevent illegal and fraudulent transfers2i and transfers in violation of contracts. Thus its use has been approved to
prevent a pledgee from disposing of pledged stock during the pendency of suit,28 to restrain a producer from disposing of sponges in
esse in violation of a contract to market them through the agency of a
sponge producers' association,2-9 to enjoin a trustee from conveying
land in violation of his trust agreement, 30 to restrain a municipality
from selling real property for taxes illegally levied, 3 1 and to enjoin an
unlawful transfer of public property.32 Furthermore, when the title
or boundary to real property is in dispute and the title and right to
possession of the disputed land has not previously been settled by a
proceeding at law, any actual possession already peaceably secured,
whether warranted in law or not, is entitled to be protected and
preserved in statu quo by an injunction to restrain any unlawful
until such time as right to possession
interference and disturbance
33
may be determined.
Freeland, 107 Fla. 286, 145 So. 257 (1932).
25Bowling v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 101 Fla. 634, 135 So. 541
(1931); Van Joel v. Hornsey, [18951 2 Ch. 774; see Notes, 32 A.L.R. 894
(1924), 39 L.1R.A. (N.s.) 31 (1912).
26
Perky Properties, Inc. v. Felton, 113 Fla. 432, 151 So. 892 (1934).
27
Robinson v. Springfield Co., 21 Fla. 203 (1885); Hayden v. Thrasher, 18
Fla.2 795 (1882).
Poynter v. Smith, 120 Fla. 469, 162 So. 874 (1935).
29Angelis v. Tarpon Springs Sponge Producers' Ass'n, 111 Fla. 740, 149 So.
630 (1933).
3OPrest v. Hammock, 92 Fla. 941, 111 So. 112 (1926).
31
Walter C. Hardesty, Inc. v. Holly Hill, 100 Fla. 1130, 131 So. 134 (1930).
82The Biscayne Co. v. Martin, 95 Fla. 259, 116 So. 66 (1928); Deering v.
Martin, 95 Fla. 224, 116 So. 54 (1928).
33
Fisher v. Rando, 154 Fla. 408, 17 So.2d 789 (1944); Jacksonville v. Giller,
102 Fla. 92, 135 So. 549 (1931); accord, Echelkamp v. Schrader, 45 Mo. 505
(1870). For a case in which the plaintiff sought to preserve the status quo by
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Mandatory Injunction
Perhaps the first appearance of the mandatory injunction occurred
in a case in which the English chancellor, not content with granting
the usual injunction against ploughing up ancient pasture lands,
ordered the defendant to show cause why he should not lay down
again that which he had ploughed.3 4 There are other instances of
early uses of such an injunction by the chancery courts. 35 While
courts of equity have on occasion continued to grant this particular
remedy, nevertheless they dread commanding a person to undo that
which has been done, and view the mandatory injunction with much
prejudice. Because, perhaps, of a literal interpretation and acceptance of the negative implication of the words "enjoin" and "restrain"
the courts have from an early day carefully phrased their mandatory
injunction decrees in negative rather than positive form. It is refreshing to observe, however, that the chancellor has been able to
sidestep the obstacle created by this formalistic approach when equity
required affirmative action. In such a case the defendant has been
enjoined from allowing a condition to continue - compliance with
such an order requiring affirmative action. No good reason existed
for this backdoor, roundabout method of procedure. The following
view was presented by Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, a very
36
learned and eminent chancellor:
"As to mandatory injunctions, their history is a curious one,
and may account for some of the expressions used by the Judges
in some of the cases cited. At one time it was supposed that the
Court would not issue mandatory injunctions at all. At a more
recent period, in cases of nuisance, a mandatory injunction was
granted under the form of restraining the Defendant from continuing the nuisance. The Court seems to have thought that
there was some wonderful virtue in that form, and that extra
caution was to be exercised in granting it. To that proposition
enjoining acts of the defendant who was in possession of land the title to which
was in dispute, and a consideration of what acts will be restrained, see Snyder
v. Hopkins, 31 Kan. 557, 3 Pac. 867 (1884). See note 133 infra.
34
Rolls v. Miller, Tot. 144, 21 Eng. Rep. 149 (Ch. 1639).
35
E.g., Murdock's Case, 2 Bland 461 (Md. Ch. 1825).
36
Smith v. Smith, L.R. 20 Eq. 500, 504 (1875) (removal of a building interfering with ancient lights).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 6
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FLORIDA

I can by no means assent. Every injunction requires to 'be
granted with care and caution .... Every Judge ought to
exercise care, and it is not more needed in one case than in
another"
The Florida Court has acknowledged the power of courts of equity
to issue an injunction mandatory in form3 7 and has in a proper case
required a defendant to restore property to its condition prior to the
time of the injury enjoined.38 Our Court has also recognized that
mandatory injunctions are looked upon with disfavor and that they
are issued with more reluctance than are prohibitory ones.3 9
Temporary Mandatory Injunction
The latest development in the law of injunctions is the granting of
a mandatory injunction on interlocutory motion. 40 It is here that the
most reluctance is shown and most safeguards required. Temporary
injunction is to a great extent preventive in character; and, as we
have seen, its purpose is to maintain the status quo. Cases arise,
nevertheless, in which the plaintiff will be damaged irreparably
unless the court forces the defendant to take affirmative action before
trial; and a system of justice that failed to provide relief in such
situations would be deplorably deficient. A court should, therefore,
consider the evidence, balance the equities, and grant or refuse the
requested mandatory injunction accordingly.
The Florida Court has granted temporary mandatory injunctions
but is committed to the doctrine that a mandatory injunction will
generally not be ordered except on final hearing, and then only to
execute the judgment or decree of the court. The Court reasons that
the granting of such an injunction before that time is like awarding
execution before trial and judgment. 41 Exceptions to this rule have
37

Bowling v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 101 Fla. 634, 135 So. 541
(1931); Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas & Elec. Power Co., 65 Fla. 404, 62 So.
919 (1913) (public utility corporation required to Perform its duties and furnish
service to the public).
38
Ocala v. Anderson, 58 Fla. 415, 50 So. 572 (1909).
39
See Johnson v. Killian, 157 Fla. 754, 757, 27 So.2d 345, 346 (1946).
- 0 See Note, 15 A.L.R.2d 213 (1951).
41
Miami Bridge Co. v. Miami Beach Ry., 152 Fla. 458, 12 So.2d 438 (1943);
Kellerman v. Chase & Co., 101 Fla. 785, 135 So. 127 (1931).
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involved cases in which the right to the injunction was free from
reasonable doubt 42 and coupled with urgent necessity or extreme
43
hardship.
An example of this situation, and the leading Florida case on
44
temporary mandatory injunctions is Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, in which
the defendant had closed a road leading to certain parts of the
plaintiff's farm which had been used by the plaintiff and the public for thirty-five years. It was evident that the plaintiff would
be greatly inconvenienced in attending his farm while the barricade
remained, and that no harm would result to the defendant by forcing
him to remove it until the hearing on the merits. In approving the
4
prayer for relief the Court said: 5
"It is well settled that mandatory injunctions are rarely granted
before final hearing, or before the parties have full opportunity
to present all the facts in such manner as will enable the court
to see and judge what the truth may be; however, instances are
not wanting where relief by mandatory injunction was granted
on the proper showing made."
The Court went on to say that in the matter of granting mandatory
injunctions each case must rest on its own facts and circumstances,
and that whether the relief will be granted is, as in other types of
injunction, in the sound discretion of the court.
Constitutional Writ of Injunction
Whatever doubt may have existed at one time concerning the
power,46 it is now well established that the Supreme Court of Florida
can issue a "constitutional writ of injunction" under Section 5 of
42

American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Rader, 160 Fla. 700, 36 So.2d 270 (1948);
House v. Nash, 90 Fla. 123, 105 So. 266 (1925); Stephens v. Stephens, 87 Fla.
466, 100 So. 746 (1924); Florida E.G. Ry. v. Taylor, 56 Fla. 788, 47 So. 845

(1908).

43 Bowling v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 101 Fla. 634, 135 So. 541
(1931).
4489 Fla. 253, 103 So. 625 (1925), cited and approved in: Price v. Gordon,
129 Fla. 715, 177 So. 276 (1937); Trust Co. of Florida v. Crider, 102 Fla. 593,
136 So. 434 (1931); Kellernian v. Chase & Co., 101 Fla. 785, 135 So. 127 (1931).
451d. at 254, 103 So. at 626.
46
See Cohen v. L'Engle, 24 Fla. 542, 549, 5 So. 235, 239 (1888).
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Article V of the Florida Constitution, which empowers the Court to
"issue ... all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of
its jurisdiction."47 The Supreme Court is not clothed with original
jurisdiction of the writ of injunction, 4R but by virtue of the quoted
provision of the Constitution is empowered to issue the injunctive
writ when essential to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It will not invoke the power so granted except in cases
carefully investigated and upon a showing (1) that the writ sought
is indispensable to protect the rights of the party seeking it; or (2)
that the law affords no other remedy; or (3) that some constitutional
or statutory provision is about to be violated; or (4) that the rights
in litigation are of such peculiar or intrinsic value or nature that the
facts of the case make it imperative that they be held in statu quo
pending the adjudication of the cause on appeal. 49 The normal
exercise of this constitutional power is by an injunction in the nature
of supersedeas pending a review of the circuit court's denial of
injunction, and is further discussed in connection with that subject
below.50

III. GRoUNDs IN GENMAL
A prerequisite of injunctive relief is that the case fall under an
acknowledged head of equity jurisdiction. Broadly speaking, there
are but two grounds for injunctive relief- statutory authority and the
inadequacy of any remedy at law. Scattered throughout our Florida
statutes are many provisions authorizing injunction in specific instances which aside from the statute may or may not be proper
subjects for that relief. These statutes often contain special conditions precedent and provisions as to notice and bond. Hence no
injunction should be brought, defended, or the thought discarded
until after a careful survey of the statutes. Independent of statute,
47

Tacker v. Board of Comm'rs, 126 Fla. 15, 170 So. 458 (1936); Anderson v.
Tower Amusement Co., 118 Fla. 437, 159 So. 782, vacated, 118 Fla. 895, 160
So. 523 (1935); Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So.
828 (1932).
4SEx parte Ivey, 26 Fla. 537, 8 So. 427 (1890).
49
Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 828 (1932);
L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1931); Wester v. Belote,
103 Fla. 976, 138 So. 721 (1931); Thursby v. Stewart, 103 Fla. 1201, 137 So. 7

(1931).

B0See note 276 infra.
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all of the usual grounds for an injunction, namely, the irreparability
of plaintiffs injury, multiplicity of actions at law, enforcement of
restrictive covenants on real estate, and other less successfully advocated grounds, are in a sense but instances where for one reason or
another the remedy at law is inadequate. It should also be noted
that the "equity" of any case may be increased by facts involving
trusts, fraud, minors, and other subjects that peculiarly appeal to
equity.

Inadequate Remedy at Law
It is settled law that an injunction should never be granted when
the remedy at law is adequate. 5 ' If the remedy at law is not full,
complete, and adequate, or if complete relief is doubtful and a more
ample and appropriate remedy may be afforded by injunction, equity
will take cognizance and give relief, provided this can be done in
accordance with recognized principles of chancery jurisdiction. 52 If
it is apparent from the allegations of the bill that there was at th 0
time of the institution of the suit an adequate remedy at law, equity
has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause.5 3 If all issues
sought to be determined by a bill for injunction to restrain the
prosecution of a law action are determinable in the law action, there
is no equity in the bill.5 4 The remedy at law may, however, be
inadequate because of the parties involved. 55 Also the subject matter
of a controversy at law may be of such complex and involved nature
that a court of equity can treat it more efficaciously than a court of
law. In such a case the defendant in the law action may bring a suit
in equity for an accounting and to enjoin further proceedings at law. 56
Further, damages resulting from a breach of contract may be un51
Egan v. Miami, 180 Fla. 465, 178 So. 132 (1938); Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Williams v. Dormany, 99 Fla.
496, 126 So. 117 (1930); Simmons v. Williford, 60 Fla. 359, 53 So. 452 (1910).
52
price v. Gordon, 129 Fla. 715, 177 So. 276 (1937); Morgan v. Lakeland,
90 Fla. 525, 107 So. 269 (1925); McNabb v. Tampa & St. Petersburg Land
Co., 78 Fla. 149, 83 So. 90 (1919); Rentz v. Granger & Lewis, 64 Fla. 445, 60
So. 221 (1912).
53
Smith v. Powell, 80 Fla. 166, 85 So. 654 (1920).
54
Palm Beach v. Gottesman, 152 Fla. 182, 11 So.2d 387 (1943); see note 99

infra.
55

Isom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 188 Fla. 260, 189 So. 253 (1939).

56

North Amer. Constr'n Co. v. Olson, 131 Fla. 440, 179 So. 659 (1938).
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ascertainable, and hence equity may enjoin the breach. In a case of
threatened continuous breach of a contract to purchase electricity
from complainant power company, the Court in approving an injunction to prevent the defendant consumer from using any power
not furnished under the contract said: 57
"The record shows that te complainant could have no adequate
and complete remedy at law because, amongst other reasons, it
was a fact that it could never be ascertained what amount of
power and energy or the value of such power and energy which
might be used by the defendant during any stated period until
after the same had been used and its amount and value determined by the meters established for that purpose.
Again, when the plantiff landlord's rental income depended on the
volume of sales of the defendant lessee, the plaintiff was held entitled
to an injunction to prevent the lessee from closing his store in violation of a covenant in the lease to keep his business open during the
entire year. The Court said: 58
•1"It
appears that it would be impractical, if not impossible, to
establish the damage to the lessor, . . . resulting from a breach
of the covenant and that the remedy at law would, therefore,
not be adequate. '
Payment of money damages in a court of law is normally adequate
for the loss of personal property, but real property is presumed to be
unique and hence inadequately compensated for by money damages. 59
Consequently, equity will take jurisdiction in cases involving the
conveyance of land but will not take jurisdiction in cases involving
personalty unless the chattel is of peculiar character and value.60
57

Manatee County Growers Ass'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 113 Fla. 449,

454, 152 So. 181, 183 (1934).
GsLincoln Tower Corp. v. Richter's Jewelry Co., 152 Fla. 542, 545, 12 So.2d

452, 454 (1943).

50
Romano v. Birmingham Ry. L. & P. Co., 182 Ala. 835, 62 So. 677 (1918);
Wilson v. Townend, 1 Drew. & Sm. 324, 62 Eng. Rep. 403 (Ch. 1860).
GOFirst Nat. Bank v. MacKenzie, 100 Fla. 1674, 131 So. 790 (1931) (injunction to restrain sale of stock certificates denied); Hughes Trust & Banking Co. v.
Consolidated Title Co., 81 Fla. 568, 88 So. 266 (1921) (replevin adequate to

recover abstracts from public records still in existence); H. W. Metcalf Co. v.
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Whether personal property is of a nature that brings it within the
orbit of equity jurisdiction is in all cases a question to be determined
by the chancellor, subject, of course, to review. Once the chattel is
found to be of peculiar value, however, equity will grant full relief
by requiring specific delivery or enjoining interference."1

IrreparableInjury
The remedy at law is not adequate when the injury done or
threatened cannot be adequately compensated in money damages

and is therefore irreparable without the intervention of equity. Injunctive relief is ordinarily warranted when an act threatened or
accomplished will produce irreparable injury to the petitioner. If
the facts alleged show an injury that can be fully compensated in
damages, an injunction should be denied. 2

Multiplicity of Suits
The prevention of a multiplicity of actions at law is a special
ground sufficient in itself to warrant equity jurisdiction, 63 and for
that purpose injunction ordinarily is freely used. 64 At an early date

the Florida Court, after stating that chancery has often intervened
to prevent a multiplicity of suits, even though there be an otherwise
Martin, 54 Fla. 531, 45 So. 463 (1907)

(bill to restrain sale of barroom fixtures

dismissed); Odlin v. Woodruff, 31 Fla. 160, 12 So. 227 (1893); Baldwin v.
Tucker, 16 Fla. 258 (1877); Davidson v. Floyd, 15 Fla. 667 (1876) (chattel
must be of some peculiar value, such as being ancient, or the production of some
distinguished artist, or a family relic or ornament).
60Price v. Gordon, 129 Fla. 715, 177 So. 276 (1937) (medicines of an
unusual type); State ex rel. Meredith v. Board of Trustees, 102 Fla. 219, 135
So. 781 (1931) (furnishings necessary in operation of home for unfortunate girls
and unmarried mothers); Bass v. Alderman, 80 Fla. 345, 86 So. 244 (1920)
(herd of cattle on the range).
62 H. W. Metcalf Co. v. Martin, 54 Fla. 531, 45 So. 463 (1907).
63 Pinellas County v. St. Petersburg, 116 Fla. 582, 156 So. 523 (1934).
64 Realty Bond & Share Co. v. Englar, 104 Fla. 329, 143 So. 152 (19 2);
Gainesville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gainesville, 63 Fla. 425, 58 So. 785 (1912).
When the injury to land is permanent, as when occupied for railroad purposes,
the judgment in an action at law for damages may include damages for future
injury; hence there is no ground for equitable jurisdiction for an injunction to
prevent a multiplicity of suits, Pensacola & A.R.R. v. Jackson. 21 Fla. 146

(1884).
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adequate remedy at law, adopted the following position: 65
"1Ihe court will not, however, grant an injunction against one
person merely because he is guilty of repeated trespasses where
the legal remedy affords an adequate and complete redress in
damages. The rule, as stated by many decisions, is, that to
justify the interference of a court of equity in cases of trespasses
in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, there must be several
persons controverting the same right, and each standing upon
his own claim or pretension."
Notwithstanding the "many decisions" referred to, the above rule, in
so far as it requires several persons, each standing upon his own claim
or pretension, appears to be a definite minority holding. Recent and
better reasoned Florida decisions indicate that the Court is at least
veering in the direction of the more generally accepted rule that if an
injury committed by one against another is continuous or is being
constantly repeated, so that the plaintiff must bring successive law
actions, the remedy at law is inadequate and equity will assume
jurisdiction. 6
In the case of Jacksonville v. Gilier,67 decided in 1931, the Court
did not consider this point but nevertheless allowed an injunction
against the city, which threatened repeated acts of usurpation over
plaintiff's land and a continued interference with the business thereon,
because a multiplicity of actions might be necessary to recover
damages for the injury done. The only issue considered was whether
the disputed parcel was part of the city street or embraced within the
property described in a lease held by plaintiff. In another case(, a
mandatory injunction issued requiring a railroad to alter an embankment that obstructed a flow of water. The Court said that "multiplicity of suits" included a constantly recurring, though seasonal and
65
Carney v. Hadley, 32 Fla. 344, 853, 14 So. 4, 7 (1893); accord, Cowan v.
Skinner, 52 Fla. 486, 42 So. 730 (1907).
G6 See 5 PoNaoy, EQurry JuRisPRUDENCE §496, n.22 (2d ed. 1919); Note,
92 A.L.R. 578, 582 (1934) (injunction against repeated or continuous trespasses to real property - doctrine that several persons must assail the same right).
See also Denver Milk Bottle Case & Can Exchange, Inc. v. McKinzie, 87 Colo.
379, 287 Pac. 868 (1930).
67102 Fla. 92, 135 So. 549 (1931).
sSeaboard All Fla. Ry. v. Underhill, 105 Fla. 409, 141 So. 306 (1932)
(alternative holding).
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intermittent, tortious injury. In Morgan v. Lakeland,6 0 the plaintiff
alleged that he had five suits at law pending against the defendant
city and would be compelled to file others if an injunction were
refused. Although this was a case of trespass to personal property
and only the two parties to the suit were involved, the injunction
issued because other remedies required a multiplicity of actions at
law.

Violation of Restrictive Covenants
In a suit to enjoin the violation of a covenant restricting the use
or occupancy of real property, appropriate allegations showing the
violation are held sufficient without an allegation that such violation
constitutes a nuisance or amounts to an irreparable injury to the
plaintiff. 70 It would, therefore, seem that this is an independent
ground for injunctive relief.

Insolvency
At a very early date Florida law appeared settled that insolvency
of a vendor, with his consequent inability to comply with his covenants or respond in money damages, was sufficient ground for an
injunction restraining the collection of purchase money. 1 Within a
relatively short time, however, these decisions were distinguished out
of existence, and the present rule evolved that insolvency alone is
not a sufficient ground for an injunction but is merely an element in
determining whether the court should grant an injunction in a given
case. 72 In Simms v. Burnette Justice Cockrell indicated unequivoc73
ably that the evolution was complete:
6990 Fla. 525, 107 So. 269 (1925).
70Stepbl v. Moore, 94 Fla. 313, 114 So. 455 (1927); see Note, 57 A.L.R.

3367 (1928).

lYonge v. McCormick, 6 Fla. 368, 63 Am. Dec. 214 (1855); Hunter v.
Bradford, 3 Fla. 269 (1850).
72
Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Godwin
v. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So. 597 (1906); Doke v. Peek, 45 Fla. 244, 34 So.
896 (1903); Carney v. Hadley, 32 Fla. 344, 14 So. 4 (1893); Pensacola &
G.R.R. v. Spratt, 12 Fla. 26, 91 Am. Dec. 747 (1867).
7355 Fla. 702, 706, 46 So. 90, 91 (1908). In an interesting case, Pepper v.
Beville, 100 Fla. 97, 129 So. 334 (1930), the defendants, receivers of an insolvent pledgee bank, demanded full payment of the balance owed by the
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"The fact of insolvency does not deprive one of his constitutional right to have decided by a jury which of the parties
breached the contract, and while it may feed another equity, it
is too weak of itself to support a bill for injunction."
IV. GmnmaAL EQUITABLE

CONSIDERATIONS

Discretion of Chancellor
Injunction, being an equitable process, is subject to all the doctrines, principles, and maxims usually applied in equity. Nothing is
better settled in Florida injunction law than the fact that injunction
is a discretionary -drit.74 Since Allen v. Hawley,7 5 decided during the
year 1855, the Court has fully recognized and continuously approved
the rule that a chancellor has broad discretion in granting, denying,
continuing, modifying, or dissolving injunctions. 7 6 This discretion
is guided by the application of established principles of equity jurisprudence to the facts, circumstances, and nature of the particular
case.77 Although the matter is discretionary, if the allegations of the
bill are sufficient and the evidence in support thereof is ample to
warrant the granting of a temporary injunction, and no sufficient
78
defense is made, an order denying an injunction will be reversed.
Likewise, the dissolution of a restraining order is not automatic
simply because the equities of the bill are denied by answer.7 9 If
plaintiff pledgor without adjustment for the value of a ring lost by the bank
and threatened to sell the remaining pledged jewelry. The Court, recognizing
that a suit against the insolvent bank would not afford the plaintiff adequate,
if any, relief and that there was no ground for trover or conversion against the
receivers, allowed the plaintiff an injunction against the proposed sale.
74
Watson v. Cochrane, 150 Fla. 783, 8 So.2d 664 (1942); Ruff v. Fisher,
115 Fla. 247, 155 So. 642 (1934). FLA. STAT. §63.73 (1949) makes it a
matter within the judicial discretion of the circuit judge to grant or deny an
application for restraining order, North Miami v. Travis Co., 118 Fla. 879, 160
So. 860 (1935).
758 Fla. 142, 68 Am. Dec. 198 (1855).
70
See Daoud v. Miami Beach, 145 Fla. 449, 452, 199 So. 582, 583 (1941),
for a collection of the cases. A recent case is State Road Dep't v. Newhall
Drainage Dist., 54 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1951).
7
7See Decumbe v. Smith, 143 Fla. 5, 8, 196 So. 595, 596 (1940).
78
Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 128 So. 821 (1980); Taylor v.
Florida E.C. Ry., 54 Fla. 635, 45 So. 574 (1907).
79
Davis v. Wilson, 189 Fla. 698, 190 So. 716 (1939).
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the answer, however, by appropriate denials and averments, sufficiently meets the asserted equities upon which a restraining order was
granted, the order should be dissolved upon proper proceedings duly
taken, unless the answer be properly controverted. 0
As in other cases, the ruling of the lower court is presumptively
correct; and, if the evidence taken by the chancellor in person contains matter sufficient to warrant his action, the appellate court will
82
not interfere."' Only clear abuse of discretion justifies reversal.
The solicitor must remember that the chancellor is not necessarily
confined to the issues presented by the litigants in exercising his
discretion. The rights of the general public, if affected, will be considered in the granting, continuing, or modifying of a temporary
restraining order.8 3 In refusing an injunction because its issuance
would probably result in confusion and disorder in the management
84
of the school system for a year, the Court said:
"This Court is committed to the doctrine that extraordinary relief
will not be granted in cases where it plainly appears that although the complaining party may be ordinarily entitled to it,
that the granting of such relief in the particular case would
result in confusion and disorder and will produce an injury to
the public which outweighs the individual right of the complainant to have the relief he seeks."
As in the issuance of a temporary injunction, the facts and the law
of the particular case guide the court in formulating the decree that
should be entered after final hearing. The conclusion of the chancellor on questions of fact as expressed in a final decree will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. 5
Ordinarily the court will take into consideration the relative inconvenience or injury which the parties will sustain by the granting or
8

OPensacola v. Bear, 83 Fla. 484, 91 So. 360 (1922).
Clark v. Kreidt, 145 Fla. 1, 199 So. 333 (1940); Shaw v. Palmer, 54 Fla.
490, 44 So. 953 (1907); Simms v. Patterson, 53 Fla. 984, 43 So. 421 (1907).
82
Bishop v. First Old State Bank, 142 Fla. 190, 194 So. 488 (1940); Willis
v. Hathaway, 95 Fla. 608, 117 So. 89 (1928).
S3Thursby v. Stewart, 103 Fla. 990, 138 So. 742 (1931); Taylor v. Florida
E.C. Ry., 54 Fla. 635, 45 So. 574 (1907).
81

84

Bronson v. Board of Public Instr'n, 108 Fla. 1, 10, 145 So. 833, 836
(1933).
85Reaves v. Sadler, 136 Fla. 553, 189 So. 41 (1939).
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This "balance of conrefusal of an application for injunction.8
venience" doctrine is normally not applied in nuisance cases. However, the language of the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Davis
87
in Gibson v. Tampa should be noted:

"A court of equity may properly refuse to grant an injunction
when it appears that greater injury and inconvenience will be
caused to the defendant by granting the injunction than will be
caused to the complainant by refusing it."
This view appears to be opposed to the current of authority established in other jurisdictions, but it can be reconciled with decisions in
those jurisdictions that hold that even in nuisance cases injunction is
discretionary. 8
Equally troublesome is the balancing of equities in encroachment
cases. The court is often put in the dilemma of choosing between
denying the injunction because the balance of hardships is in favor
of the defendant and in effect allowing the defendant to exercise a
private right of eminent domain, or granting an injunction and thereby
aiding the plaintiff in extortion.8 9 In a late Florida case90 defendants' concrete block garage, built some twenty years before by
their precedecessor in title, encroached slightly on plaintiffs adjoining
land. The injury to the adjoining land was slight and the garage
could not readily be moved. The Court, balancing the equities,
denied a mandatory injunction that would have compelled removal
of the garage and relegated plaintiffs to their remedy at law. The
soSee, e.g., Wefel v. Williams & Pritchett, 58 Fla. 538, 541, 50 So. 679, 680
(1909). The rule does not apply to every case, see, e.g., Lincoln Tower Corp.
v. Bichter's Jewelry Co., 152 Fla. 542, 545, 12 So.2d 452, 453 (1943), in which
the Court recognized that its injunction decree would cause the defendant
"extreme difficulty," but that refusal to act "is a hardship that should not be
visited upon the [plaintiff]."
87114 Fla. 619, 620, 154 So. 842 (1934).
88
The problem of "balancing the equities" in nuisance cases is too involved
for further discussion in the limited space of this article. The interested reader
is referred to 5 POmsoy, EQurry JUSPRUDEN Ec. §580 (2d ed. 1919); WAISH,
EQurry §56 (1930); Notes, 61 A.L.R. 924 (1929), 39 L.R.A. (w.s.) 580 (1912),
81 L.R.A. (N.s.) 881 (1911).
s0See WALsH, EQurry §55 (1930); 27 N.C.L. Rzv. 548 (1939); Note, 96
A.L.R. 1287 (1935) and McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exch. Co., 133
Fla. 740, 183 So. 7 (1938).
9
OJohnson v. Killian, 157 Fla. 754, 27 So.2d 345 (1946).
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Court referred with approval to the Illinois case of Pradelt v. Lewis,91
92
in which it was stated:
"... where the encroachment is slight and the cost of removing
it will be great and the corresponding benefit to the adjoining
owner small, or compensation and damages can be had, the
court will ordinarily decline to compel a removal and will leave
the complaining party to his remedy at law."
Further commenting on the subject, the Illinois court said that in
order to be granted the relief the complaining party should show the
damage to be irreparable and the encroachment intentional.

Laches
An injunction will not be granted if the person seeking it could, by
proper vigilance, have protected himself by the ordinary means at
law. 93 Laches does not depend on lapse of time alone but is predicated upon delay in bringing suit, which has operated to the disadvantage of the other party or has evidenced assent by complainant.
When such laches is present the remedy of injunction should be
denied. Injunction should not be denied, however, simply because
4
the complainant might have begun his action sooner.
There may be a degree of laches in the prosecution of a suit to
final decree after obtaining an injunction that will justify the dissolution of the injunction, but, at least under some circumstances, gross
negligence is required.9 5
V. SPECIFIC SUBJECTs oFREui

Proceedings at Law
The power to stay proceedings at law for the purpose of exercising
91297 Ill.
874, 180 N.E. 785 (1921).
921d. at 877, 130 N.E. at 787.
93

County Comm'rs v. Bryson, 13 Fla. 281 (1871).
Seaboard All Fla. Ry. v. Underhill, 105 Fla. 409, 141 So. 806 (1982);
Mercer v. Keynton, 99 Fla. 914, 127 So. 859 (1930) (involving delay in restraining violation of restrictive covenants until after a building had progressed
materially).
9rScarlett v. Hicks, 13 Fla. 314 (1871).
94

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 6
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FLORIDA

equitable control over the parties and proceedings, to the end that
justice may be promoted, seems to be inherent in courts of general
jurisdiction. A court of equity in interpleader proceedings may
enjoin an action at law in order to draw the entire litigation into one
principal action.90 An injunction decree to restrain proceedings at
law admits the jurisdiction of the law courts but issues on the ground
that they are making use of their jurisdiction contrary to equity and
97
good conscience.
A Florida statute98 requires notice, bond, and payment of all costs
of the suit at law before injunction to stay proceedings at law shall
issue. Whether the injunction stays proceedings before or after
verdict, the bond is conditioned to protect the plaintiff at law in case
complainant fails to secure aid in the equity court.
Jurisdiction to enjoin actions at law is to be exercised sparingly and
only when other remedies are inadequate and the equities invoking it
are clear and strong. 9 It has been stated that fraud, accident,
mistake, and discovery are the four principal grounds upon which
injunctions may issue to stay proceedings at law. 00 If the complainant shows himself to be entitled to some purely equitable remedy,
thereby giving equity jurisdiction of the case, pending or threatened
actions at law concerning the same subject matter may be enjoined.
When equity has once obtained jurisdiction for one purpose it will
generally dispose of the entire case, bringing in all necessary parties
and enjoining actions at law in order to prevent circuity of action and
a multiplicity of suits, the object being to render complete justice
between the parties in one proceeding.' 0 '
96Miller v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 148 Fla. 1, 3 So.2d 519 (1941); Crockett v. Volunteer Life Ins. Co., 142 Fla. 750, 196 So. 297 (1940); Curtis v. Albritton, 101
Fla. 853, 132 So. 677 (1931).
9TSee Finegan v. Mayor, 18 Fla. 127, 130 (1881); accord, Platt v. Woodruff,
61 9N.Y.
(16 Sick.) 378 (1875).
8
FLA. STAT. §64.02 (1949).
Construing the predecessor of this statute in
the early case of Scarlett v. Hicks, 13 Fla. 314 (1871), the Court said at page
322: "The intention of the Legislature here was to require at the hands of the
defendant at law due security for a compliance with the result of the suit at
law before he could question it in a court of chancery. Having failed in the
suit at law, he must give security for a compliance therewith in case he fails
to secure the aid of a court of equity."
DOCity of Stuart v. Green, 156 Fla. 551, 23 So.2d 831 (1945); Isom v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y, 138 Fla. 260, 189 So. 253 (1939).
'001osee Finegan v. Mayor, 18 Fla. 127, 130 (1881).
' North American Constr'n Co. v. Olson, 131 Fla. 440, 179 So. 659 (1938);
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It has been repeatedly held that legal proceedings will not be
enjoined upon grounds which the law court, upon proper pleas, is
competent to adjudicate.1 0 2 Under Florida practice, equitable pleas
may be interposed in actions at law; but only negative defenses can
be interposed, and no affirmative relief can be obtained.' 0 3 Therefore, if any affirmative equitable relief is necessary to a full settlement of the controversy and to a complete protection of the defendant's
rights, a court of equity will entertain a suit for such relief.' 0 4 A good
example is the situation in which the defendant at law seeks the
intervention of equity to enjoin further prosecution of an ejectment
action because there is a mistake or erroneous description in the deed
under which he entered into possession, and it is necessary that he be
permitted to introduce the corrected deed in evidence. In such a
case a prayer for reformation is a prayer for affirmative relief; and,
since in Florida only a court of equity is competent to grant such
relief, equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the prosecution of the ejectment suit unless the deed as reformed would constitute no defense. 10 5
The power of a court of equity to restrain parties from commencing or prosecuting legal proceedings extends to suits in equity
as well as to actions at law. But one court of equity should not
ordinarily enjoin a party from proceeding in another court of equity
of equal and coordinate jurisdiction merely for reasons of convenience. 10 6 The propriety of obtaining an injunction to restrain a
chancery decree rather than restraining the decree by petition filed
07
in the same suit was extensively considered in an early Florida case.1
Pepple v. Rogers, 104 Fla. 462, 140 So. 205 (1932).
1 2
0 Palm Beach v. Gottesman, 152 Fla. 182, 11 So.2d 337 (1943); Proodian
v. Plymouth Citrus Growers' Ass'n, 143 Fla. 788, 197 So. 540 (1940); Garrett
v. Phillips, 101 Fla. 426, 134 So. 231 (1931); Peacock v. Feaster, 52 Fla. 565,
42 So. 889 (1906); Peacock v. Irvine, 52 Fla. 562, 42 So. 894 (1906); Byrne
v. Brown, 40 Fla. 109, 23 So. 877 (1898); Cohen v. L'Engle, 29 Fla. 579, 11
So. 47 (1892); Freeman v. Timanus, 12 Fla. 393 (1868).
03
City of Stuart v. Green, 156 Fla. 551, 23 So.2d 831 (1945); Pepple v.
Rogers, 104 Fla. 462, 140 So. 205 (1932).
04
1 Isom v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 138 Fla. 260, 189 So. 253 (1939);
Bailey v. Inman, 105 Fla. 1, 140 So. 783 (1932); Pepple v. Rogers, 104 Fla.
462, 140 So. 205 (1932).
10 5E.g., Crompton v. Kirkland, 157 Fla. 89, 24 So.2d 902 (1946); Osceola
Fertilizer Co. v. Beville, 86 Fla. 479, 98 So. 354 (1928); Raulerson v. Peeples,
79 Fla. 367, 84 So. 370 (1920); Griffin v. Fries, 23 Fla. 173, 2 So. 266 (1887).
l0 6 Ray v. Williams Phosphate Co., 59 Fla. 598, 52 So. 589 (1910); see Note,
102 A.L.R. 308 (1936).
107 Robinson v. Springfield Co., 21 Fla. 203, 225 (1885).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 6

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FLORIDA
In that case the Court approved a separate injunction suit by one not
a party to the pending equity proceeding, because a petition in the
original cause would have been cumbersome and unnecessary.
An equity court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to enjoin the institution or continuation of criminal prosecutions; nor will the Supreme
10 8
Court issue its constitutional writ to enjoin criminal prosecutions.
Our Court regards this as well settled even in cases in which the bill
alleges a threat of multiplicity of future prosecutions and forfeitures
incident thereto. The arrested person is deemed to have an adequate
remedy at law by habeas corpus or other proceeding. 109 There are
well-recognized exceptions to this rule, however. If criminal proceedings are threatened under an allegedly unconstitutional statute
affecting property rights, courts of equity have jurisdiction to enjoin
the institution of the criminal proceedings. To warrant such interference, however, the circumstances must be exceptional and the
danger of irremediable loss great and immediate." x0 The right to
earn a livelihood and to continue in one's employment unmolested by
efforts to impose void enactments is likewise entitled to protection."'
Even though acts of an accused may ultimately be held not within
provisions of a valid criminal statute and the threatened proceedings
may be destructive of property rights in the meantime, proceedings
should not be enjoined if the asserted rights sought to be protected
by the injunction are of doubtful validity and have never been duly
submitted for adjudication in courts of criminal jurisdiction. Injunction will issue if a multiplicity of suits renders a defense against
attempted enforcement of a valid statute unduly burdensome on
property or personal rights before a final decision can be rendered,
or if the enforcement of a statute which is probably unconstitutional
2
would have the same effect."
Another exception applies only to those cases in which a plaintiff
in equity attempts to resort to a criminal procedure to enforce against
the defendant the same rights that he is asserting against him in
'OSTaylor v. Trianon Amusement Co., 146 Fla. 447, 200 So. 912 (1941);
Stocks v. Lee, 144 Fla. 627, 198 So. 211 (1940); The Merry-Go-Round, Inc. v.
State ex rel. Jones, 136 Fla. 278, 186 So. 538 (1939).
109Jacksonville v. Wilson, 157 Fla. 838, 27 So.2d 108 (1946); Stocks v. Lee,
144 Fla. 627, 198 So. 211 (1940).
1'OPohl Beauty School, Inc. v. Miami, 118 Fla. 664, 159 So. 789 (1935);
L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1931).
111
Watson v. Centro Espanol de Tampa, 158 Fla. 796, 30 So.2d 288 (1947).
112
Sweat v. Daley, 116 Fla. 755, 156 So. 720 (1934).
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equity. In Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. State ex rel. Ferguson13 the state,
on relation of a citizen, sought to enjoin defendant's operation of a

theater "bank night" under what is now Section 64.11 of Florida
Statutes 1949. The injunction was granted but the defendant appealed, obtaining a supersedeas pending appeal. The prosecuting
attorney was about to institute criminal proceedings against the
defendant when the defendant asked the Supreme Court to issue its
constitutional writ of injunction to restrain criminal prosecution until
the determination of the matter in equity. The Court granted the
prayer on the ground that the state, by submitting itself as plaintiff in
the equity court, had given that court jurisdiction, at least for the
time being, of the entire case.
When two actions at law are based upon the same matter and are
between the same parties, the action last filed may be enjoined."-4
If courts of law and equity have coordinate jurisdiction of a cause,
the court first assuming jurisdiction will retain it and determine the
entire controversy, and if that court is the equity court it will restrain
the action at law. 15
Enforcement of a judgment of a law court which had jurisdiction
over the parties and subject matter will not be enjoined unless there
is proof of extrinsic fraud." 6 Intrinsic fraud, such as perjury or
subornation of perjury, which may be the basis of a stay of execution
by a law court, 117 will not justify action by equity. 118 But, if a defendant relies upon a written assurance that default will not be taken,
a court of equity will enjoin judgment taken in violation of that
assurance. 1 9 Also, a creditor of an insolvent decedent is entitled to
enjoin execution of a judgment obtained by another creditor after
11"183 Fla. 634, 182 So. 842 (1938).
114Watson v. Pepper, 134 Fla. 586, 184 So. 131 (1938).
1 5Wiliams v. Bullington, 159 Fla. 618, 32 So.2d 273 (1947).
"l6 Jeffery Lumber Co. v. Coleman, 149 Fla. 704, 6 So.2d 821 (1942); Allison
v. Handy Andy Stores, Inc., 106 Fla. 274, 143 So. 263 (1932) (denying injunction against enforcement of a judgment alleged to have been proved by false
return of process when no fraud or other ground of equitable cognizance was
advanced).
11rFrA. STAT. §55.38 (1949) provides that the court may "...
for good
cause . . . direct a stay (of execution] . . . and the suspension of proceedings
thereon."
"WKearley v. Hunter, 154 Fla. 81, 16 So.2d 728 (1944); Nelson v. Hansard,
143 Fla. 898, 197 So. 513 (1940); Michel v. Sammis, 15 Fla. 308 (1875);
Gamble v. Campbell, 6 Fla. 347 (1855); see Note, 30 L.R.A. 786 (1896).
119
Purviance v. Edwards, 17 Fla. 140 (1879).
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suggestion of insolvency was filed in the county court and notice
given to creditors. 120 Similarly, a creditor may enjoin enforcement of
a foreclosure decree when the mortgage and foreclosure are but a
device to defraud creditors. 121 Enforcement will also be enjoined if
12 2
there is surprise tantamount to fraud.
Equity will also enjoin execution on a void judgment. Thus a
judgment in excess of the jurisdictional amount of the court rendering
it123 or against one not a party to the suit will be enjoined.12 4
Indeed, it has been said that a collateral attack on a judgment by suit
to enjoin levy of execution thereon cannot prevail unless the judgment
is void. 1 25 Here, as in other suits for injunction, if there is an adequate
remedy at law by appeal equitable relief will not be granted to one
126
who has neglected to avail himself of it.

Trespass
Originally chancery did not enjoin a trespass upon land. By
analogy to the remedy of injunction to prevent waste, which had been
recognized since the thirteenth century and was dependent upon
privity of title between the parties, equity extended the remedy to
cases of trespass without privity of title under certain conditions. The
basis of the jurisdiction in such cases was the probability of irreparable injury, 27 the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, the destruction of the estate in the character in which it had been enjoyed,
or the prevention of a multiplicity of suits when the right to the
by numerous persons, each insisting on his
property was controverted
128
individual right.

120Scarlett v. Hicks, 13 Fla. 314 (1871).
1lRobinson v. Springfield Co., 21 Fla. 203 (1885).

122Hoey v. Jackson, 31 Fla. 541, 13 So. 459 (1893); Dibble v. Truluck, 12
Fla. 185 (1868).
'2 3E.g., Wilson v. Sparkman, 17 Fla. 871, 35 Am. Rep. 110 (1880); see
Note, 31 L.R.A. 200 (1896).
12 4E.g., Purviance v. Edwards, 17 Fla. 140 (1879).
125Fisher v. Rawleigh Co., 141 Fla. 717, 193 So. 747 (1940).
120Wordehoff v. Evers, 18 Fla. 339 (1881); Dibble v. Truluck, 12 Fla. 185
(1868).
127See Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Feagin, 90 Fla. 62, 64, 105 So. 141 (1925).
128 Davis v. Wilson, 189 Fla. 698, 190 So. 716 (1939); Brown v. Solary, 37

Fla. 102, 19 So. 161 (1896); Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So. 859
(1895).
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Something more than a mere trespass, susceptible of adequate
remuneration, must be shown before a court of equity will exercise
jurisdiction. 129 Three situations are most common: (1) title to the
land is in dispute; (2) title is not in dispute but the trespass is in the
nature of waste; (3) title is not in dispute but a repeated or continuous trespass is threatened.
(1). The confusion regarding the trial of legal titles in equity
seems to have dated from the time of Lord Eldon, who remarked in
Pillsworth v. Hopton,130 "I remember perfectly being told from the
bench very early in life, that if the plaintiff filed a bill for an account,
and an injunction to restrain waste, stating, that the defendant claimed
by a title adverse to his, he stated himself out of court as to the
injunction." Even today with some exceptions equity will leave the
determination of title hinging upon a question of fact to a court of
law. 1 3 1 By 1817, however, courts of equity were granting temporary
injunctions to protect the plaintiff during the period of time required
for bringing an action at law.132 At the present time the form of
equitable assistance probably most often invoked in litigation over
real estate is the interlocutory injunction issued to maintain the status
quo pending a decision on the merits in an action to try title.1 3 The
Florida Court has stated that the plaintiff's title must be admitted or
legally established in order to give a court of equity jurisdiction to
enjoin a mere trespass on land."" The grantee of the successful
"29 Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So. 859 (1895); Carney v. Hadley, 32

Fla. 344, 14 So. 4 (1893); Indian River Steamboat Co. v. East Coast Trans. Co.,
28 Fla. 387, 10 So. 480 (1891); Baldwin v. Tucker, 16 Fla. 258 (1877).
2306

Ves. 51, 52, 31 Eng. Rep. 933 (Ch. 1801); see Comment, 11 CoPr.Nxx.

L.Q. 547 (1926). Several reasons have been advanced for the reluctance of the
chancery courts to render decrees when the disputed title to land turns upon
a question of fact; see CLArm, EQUITY §192 (1919); WALsH, EQUITY §30 (1930);

Note, 32 A.L.R. 463, 502 (1924).
13"The Florida Court has held that a constitutional right to a trial by jury
exists in such a case, Jacksonville v. Giller, 102 Fla. 92, 135 So. 549 (1981).
See also Woodstock Operating Corp. v. Quinn, 201 Ala. 681, 79 So. 253 (1918).
132Jones v. Jones, 3 Mer. 161, 36 Eng. Rep. 62 (Ch. 1817).
133E.g., Perky Properties, Inc. v. Felton, 113 Fla. 432, 151 So. 892 (1934);

Brown v. Solary, 87 Fla. 102, 19 So. 161 (1896).
1"4Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Feagin, 90 Fla. 62, 105 So. 141 (1925); Brown v.
Solary, 37 Fla. 102, 19 So. 161 (1896); Carney v. Hadley, 32 Fla. 344, 14 So. 4
(1893).
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plaintiff in ejectment in possession under his grant may enjoin a
trespasser whose sole claim of title is under the unsuccessful defendant
35
in ejectment.'
(2). Acts of a trespasser admittedly without title causing permanent damage, which would constitute waste if done by a tenant, will
be enjoined in equity because the damages at law are inadequate.
The mining and taking of phosphate rock from land valuable chiefly
on account of the phosphate amounts to a destruction of the substance
of the estate in the character in which it has been enjoyed, and the
injury resulting therefrom is of such irreparable nature as to authorize
a court of equity to enjoin it, on proper bill by the real owner. 1386
Similarly, if trees are of peculiar value and importance because of
their condition or use as a part of the underlying estate, their destruction or injury would actually be an injury to the owner of the land in
the use and enjoyment of his estate for which money damages would
not be adequate compensation. In a proper case brought under this
rule the court may in granting the injunction proceed to an accounting
and award damages sustained by the trespass as an incident to the
relief by injunction. 137 The cutting and removal of ornamental trees
may under this theory be restrained, 38 but the simple working of pine
trees for turpentine in the customary manner is not irreparable injury.xro This latter holding is circumvented, however, by an amend140
ment to Section 64.08 of Florida Statutes 1949 which now provides:
3s5Williams v. Richardson, 66 Fla. 234, 63 So. 446 (1913).
130 Brown v. Solary, 87 Fla. 102, 19 So. 161 (1896).
137 Davis v. Wilson, 139 Fla. 698, 190 So. 716 (1939); Cowan v. Skinner, 52
Fla. 486, 42 So. 730 (1906); Brown v. Solary, 37 Fla. 102, 19 So. 161 (1896);
Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So. 859 (1895).
' 38 Binnicker v. Leeper, 138 Fla. 738, 190 So. 6 (1939).
'39Cowan v. Skinner, 52 Fla. 486, 42 So. 730 (1906); Carney v. Hadley, 32
Fla. 344, 14 So. 4 (1893).
140The language "or the timber, or the right to work for turpentine purposes
the timber on any lands" was added in 1907 after several decisions had denied
the benefit of this statute to one not claiming the land but only the timber or
turpentine rights thereon, Doke v. Peek, 45 Fla. 244, 34 So. 896 (1903); McDonald v. Padgett, 46 Fla. 501, 35 So. 336 (1903). An action brought under
this statute for a trespass committed under such circustances that equity could
not enjoin it independently of the statute differs in several aspects from an
action under the common law rule stated in the text. Under the statute (1) no
actual physical possession, or pedis possessio, by the owner is necessary, Reddick
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"Courts of chancery shall entertain suits by any person claiming
to own any timbered lands, or the timber, or the right to work
for turpentine purposes the timber on any lands in this state, to

enjoin trespass on such lands by the cutting of trees thereon, or
the removing of logs therefrom, or by boxing or scraping the said
trees for the purpose of making turpentine, or by the removal of
turpentine therefrom."
(3). An injunction may be had against continuous or repeated
trespasses that threaten to continue indefinitely, even though they are
not in the nature of waste. 141 In such cases, when it is necessary in
order to quiet a rightful, admitted, or established possession, chancery
has often interposed to prevent a multiplicity of suits even though
there be a remedy at law.142 It should be remembered that by
"multiplicity of suits" in this situation the Court has reference to its
rule requiring suit by several persons, each standing upon his own

claim, as previously discussed.1 43 If the injury is of a permanent
nature, such as the flooding of land or the laying of a railroad, the
damages recoverable at law are deemed to include present as well as
44
future injury, and there is no danger of further litigation.1

v. Meffert, 82 Fla. 409, 18 So. 894 (1898); (2) irreparable injury or other
ground for injunctive relief need not be shown; (8) no accounting or award
of damages in equity in connection with the suit is possible, Cowan v. Skinner.
52 Fla. 486, 42 So. 780 (1906); MeMillan v. Wiley, 45 Fla. 487, 88 So. 993
(1903); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Gibson, 48 Fla. 815, 81 So. 280 (1901); Wiggins
v. Williams, 86 Fla. 687, 18 So. 859 (1895). The reasoning of the cases establishing this restriction on an action brought under this statute legically applies
with equal force to any action brought under the authority of any of the many
statutes in Florida providing the remedy of injunction where it would not otherwise
exist. This is a definite limitation on the general rule that when equity assumes
jurisdiction to grant an injunction it may award any other relief essential to do
complete justice between the parties, Baylen St. Wharf Co. v. Pensacola, 89
So.2d 66 (Fla. 1949); State Road Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So.2d 298
(1941).
141jacksonville v. Giller, 102 Fla 92, 185 So. 549 (1931); Morgan v. Lakeland, 90 Fla. 525, 107 So. 269 (1925); McGourin v. DeFuniak Springs, 51 Fla.
502, 41 So. 541 (1906); Richardson v. Kittlewell, 45 Fla. 551, 88 So. 984
(1903); Baya v. Lake City, 44 Fla. 491, 88 So. 400 (1902); see Note, 92 A.L.R.
578 (1934).
14 2
Cowan v. Skinner, 52 Fla. 486, 42 So. 780 (1906); Carney v. Hadley, 82
Fla. 844, 14 So. 4 (1893).
3
14:
See page 572 supra.
1 44
Jarrett Lumber Corp. v. Christopher, 65 Fla. 379, 61 So. 831 (1918);
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Nuisance
The development and present law of nuisance are beyond the scope
of this article, which is confined to noting some of the more general
distinctions and rules as they relate to the use of injunction in nuisance
cases. 145 Generally, nuisances fall into two groups: (1) acts of
wrongful user by an owner or possessor of land resulting in an unreasonable interference with the rights of enjoyment of the owner or
possessor of neighboring land, and (2) wrongful interference with
easements or other incorporeal rights. 146 Nuisances are further classified as private or public, and as acts that are nuisances per se as
distinguished from acts that may be nuisances depending upon time,
circumstances, and location.
While only an act which is a nuisance at all times and under any
circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings, is a nuisance
per se, anything that annoys or disturbs one in the free use, possession,
or enjoyment of his property or that renders its ordinary use 1or7
occupation physically uncomfortable may become a nuisance. 4
Courts of equity are reluctant to interfere by injunction with the free
use and enjoyment of property by an owner or occupant, and will
that the use and
only interfere when it is clearly made to appear
14 8
enjoyment are injurious to the rights of others.
An injunction to restrain a nuisance will be granted ex parte only
if the plaintiff shows a case of urgent necessity or one in which
irreparable mischief would otherwise be produced. If the thing
sought to be restrained is a nuisance per se, and it so appears from
the facts set forth in the bill, the court will give its aid to stay irreparable mischief and will grant a temporary injunction until the parties
can have a hearing. But when the thing sought to be restrained is not
in itself noxious but only something that may according to circumstances prove so, the court will refuse to interfere 49 until after final
Pensacola & A.R.R. v. Jackson, 21 Fla. 146 (1884).
14 GFor a historical analysis of the development of nuisance see McRae, The
Development of Nuisance in the Earlg Common Law, 1 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 27
(1948).
46
1 See WAIsH, EQurrY §33 (1930).
147Mercer v. Keynton, 121 Fla. 87, 163 So. 411 (1935).
14sGodwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So. 597 (1906);

Shivery v. Streeper,

24 Fla. 103, 3 So. 865 (1888); Randall v. Jacksonville St. R.R., 19 Fla. 409
(1882); Thebaut v. Canova, 11 Fla. 143 (1866).
140 Thebaut v. Canova, 11 Fla. 143 (1866).
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hearing or trial at law.

The authority of courts of equity to interfere by way of injunction
in cases of private nuisance is founded upon their power to restrain

irreparable mischief or to prevent a multiplicity of suits. It follows,
therefore, that not every case that gives rise to a right of action at law
will justify the interposition of courts of equity to redress the injury

or remove the annoyance caused by a nuisance. On the other hand,
when the injury is irreparable, or loss of health, loss of trade, destruction of the means of subsistence, or permanent ruin to property

may ensue from the wrongful act, a court of equity will interfere by
injunction to protect the rights so endangered or violated. 10
Although not frequently exercised, the power undoubtedly exists in
A court of law can
courts of equity to enjoin public nuisances."'
reach only existing nuisances, and future acts must be the subject of
new prosecutions or proceedings. Therefore this phase of equity
jurisdiction is both necessary and salutary, especially when a nuisance
affects the health, morals, or safety of the community. In the absence

of statutory permission, an individual generally may not bring suit to
enjoin a public nuisance.

The rule is otherwise if the individual

suffers special or peculiar substantial injury different52in kind and not
merely degree from the injury to the public at large.'

Often a nuisance is both private and public. Such was the situation
in the recent and novel Florida case of Shamhart v. Morrison Cafeteria
153
in which the defendant's downtown cafeteria attracted more
Co.,
150 Seaboard All Fla. Ry. v. Underhill, 105 Fla. 409, 141 So. 306 (1932);
Thebaut v. Canova, 11 Fla. 143 (1866).
151Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bryan, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801

(1927).

15 2 Biscayne Co. v. Martin, 95 Fla. 259, 116 So. 66 (1928); Deering v. Martin,
95 Fla. 224, 116 So. 54 (1928); Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla.
All
447, 52 So. 802 (1910); Robins v. White, 52 Fla. 613, 42 So. 841 (1906).
suits to enjoin nuisances as defined in FLA. STAT. §823.05 (1949) must be
brought in accordance with §§64.11-64.15, Losey v. State ex rel. Giblin, 158
Fla. 381, 28 So.2d 604 (1947). In a suit by an individual in the name of the
state to enjoin a nuisance as authorized by FLA. STAT. §64.11 (1949), no
special damage to the individual need be shown, Valdez v. State ex rel. Farrior,
142 Fla. 123, 194 So. 388 (1940); State ex rel. Moore v. Gillian, 141 Fla. 707,
193 So. 751 (1940); National Container Corp. v. State ex tel. Stockton, 138
Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939).
153159 Fla. 629, 32 So.2d 727 (1947); 1 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 316 (1948);
1 ALA. L. REv. 67 (1948); 26 Cm-KENT REv. 355 (1948); 20 Miss. L.J. 92
(1948); 20 TENN. L. REv. 699 (1949); 1 VAND. L. REv. 324 (1948).
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patrons than its conventional lobby and entrance approach could
accommodate. The potential customers formed lines on the public
sidewalk and frequently blocked the entrances to plaintiff's nearby
drugstore. Plaintiff sued to enjoin the nuisance and sought damages
for loss of business. The Florida Supreme Court held that the defendant should be enjoined and that the court below should ascertain
what damages the plaintiff had sustained. Pursuant to this mandate,
the lower court decreed that the defendant provide sufficient space
upon its premises to accommodate the waiting lines, and assessed
plaintiff's damages, including interest and costs, at $3,801.92. On
second appeal 5 4 the Supreme Court of Florida modified this decree
by striking that portion requiring the defendant to enlarge its premises,
and approved an agreement between the parties which provided that
defendant should station an attendant on the sidewalk to supervise
the waiting lines in a manner so as not to obstruct the plaintiff's store
entrances. With this modification the decree of the lower court was
affirmed.
Contracts
If contracts are classified as either affirmative, in which it is agreed
that something will be done, or negative, in which it is agreed that
something will not be done, the equitable remedy for breach of the
first class is a decree for specific performance, and for breach of the
second is an injunction. 155 Accordingly, an injunction restraining the
breach is a negative specific enforcement of that contract. It may be
stated as a general proposition that whenever the contract is one of a
class which will be specifically enforced in an affirmative manner, a
court of equity will restrain its breach by injunction if that is the only
practicable mode of enforcement which its terms permit.156 The
tendency of the American courts has been to limit, rather than to
enlarge, the area in which this relief will be granted. English courts
will enjoin the violation of some contracts, even though they cannot
be specifically enforced; but American courts, with few exceptions,
refuse to adopt this doctrine.1 r Performance of an agreement should
154 Shambart v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 160 Fla. 540, 85 So.2d 842 (1948).
155 Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 128 So. 821 (1930).
'GOThompson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 130 Fla. 652, 178 So. 413 (1938);
Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 128 So. 821 (1930).
15 7Thompson i. Shell Petroleum Corp., 130 Fla. 652, 178 So. 418 (1938).
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not be specifically enforced, pendente lite, by use of a temporary
injunction against its breach, unless such performance is urgently
necessary prior to final hearing or unless such interlocutory relief is
indispensable to the preservation of plaintiff's ultimate rights. 158
Usually the breach of a contract will not be enjoined unless there
be a mutuality of remedy as well as of obligation. 159 Actions to
enjoin the cancellation of leases are exceptions to this rule. It has
been held that the fact that a lease is terminable at the option only of
the lessee does not of itself render the lease objectionable for lack of
mutuality of remedy or prevent the party in whose favor the option
exists from enjoining a breach of its terms.'1 0 On the other hand, the
"lack of mutuality" rule has been used to support the refusal of
injunctive relief in cases involving the enforcement of restrictive
Laundry
covenants in contracts of employment.' 6 ' In Love v. Miami
162
Co. the Court used the following rather broad language:
"A court of equity should not lend its power to enforce the
provisions of an executory contract against one of the parties
unless the terms and conditions of the contract are such that the
court of equity might enforce at least a part of the terms thereof
against the other party."
Florida has followed the general rule' 63 that, independently of the
requirement of mutuality of remedy, courts will not enforce such
restrictive covenants in personal service contracts in the absence of
' 58 Anderson v. Tower Amusement Co., 118 Fla. 437, 159 So. 782, vacated,
118 Fla. 895, 160 So. 523 (1935) (injunction allowed); Bowling v. National
Convoy & Trucking Co., 101 Fla. 634, 135 So. 541 (1931); Garriga v. Reid
Lumber Co., 97 Fla. 321, 120 So. 849 (1929); Campbell v. Maull, 69 Fla. 102,
67 So. 639 (1915); Taylor v. Florida E.C. Ry., 54 Fla. 635, 45 So. 574 (1907).
159See Note, 8 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1949).
' 60City Market Bldg., Inc. v. Giglio, 157 Fla. 760, 26 So.2d 785 (1946);
Thompson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 130 Fla. 652, 178 So. 413 (1938); see Note,
117 A.L.R. 256 (1938).
161J. Schaeffer, Inc. v. Hoppen, 127 Fla. 703, 173 So. 900 (1937); Lewis v.

Kirkland, 118 Fla. 350, 160 So. 44 (1935); Wheeler v. Mickles, 118 Fla. 348,
160 So. 45 (1935); Nettles v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 118 Fla. 345, 160 So. 42
(1935); Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 118 Fla. 137, 160 So. 32 (1935); see
Note, 98 A.L.R. 963, 987 (1935).
162118 Fla. 137, 142, 160 So. 32, 34 (1935).
63
1 REsTATmENT, CoNTRAcTs §380 (1933).
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some special equity.164
In Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan Justice Davis, with no lack of
certainty, expressed the Court's attitude on the doctrine of "clean
hands" in cases seeking injunction against breach of contract:'165
"A party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of a contract by
another, unless he himself has performed what the contract
requires of him so far as possible; if he himself is in default or
has given cause for non-performance by defendant, he has no
standing in equity."
Our Court has apparently approved the view that when a contract
involves peculiar convenience or advantage, or the loss occasioned by
its breach would be a matter of uncertainty, a threatened or impending tortious interference by a person not a party to the contract
may be enjoined by the party whose enjoyment of existing contractual
rights is thus endangered. The application of this doctrine is no
longer restricted to contracts for personal services. Nor is it necessary
to enjoin all the "tort-feasors as defendants when there are more than
one, since a person receiving injury from the tortious acts of others
has a remedy against one or all of the tort-feasors and may enforce
that remedy against one or all at his election, either at law or in
6
equity. 6
Enforcement of Statutes and Ordinances
Injunctions are sometimes sought to prohibit the enforcement of
statutes'8 7 or municipal ordinances. A chancery court may grant a
164By "special equity" the Court indicated it meant a case involving good
will, peculiar intellectual or other skill or capacity, trade secret or secret process,
direct contact with the complainant's customers, creating a personal influence
and following upon and among them, which might be carried as an asset to a
new firm, or other recognized ground, Simms v. Burnette, 55 Fla. 702, 46 So.
90 (1908); Simms v. Patterson, 55 Fla. 707, 46 So. 91 (1908).
16599 Fla. 1296, 1305, 128 So. 821, 824 (1930); accord, J. S. Betts Co. v.
South Ga. Ry., 69 Fla. 46, 67 So. 861 (1915) (temporary injunction enjoining
the refusal to carry out a contract- dissolved upon showing that complainant had
repeatedly violated many essential provisions of the contract).
' 6 6Knight v. Miami, 127 Fla. 585, 173 So. 801 (1937); Dade Enterprises,
Inc. v. Wometco Theatres, Inc., 119 Fla. 70, 160 So. 209 (1935); see Note,
84 A.L.R. 850 (1933).
1 7
6 State ex rel. Watson v. Lee, 158 Fla. 148, 28 So.2d 104 (1946); Mayo
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temporary injunction on the ground that application of a statute will
probably be unconstitutional. The usual conditions precedent, such
as irreparable injury, must of course be proved.' 68 Courts are not
authorized to enjoin the operation of a statute that has been duly
adjudged constitutional and operative unless the statute is being
illegally applied or unless the statute, or the challenged part of it, is
unconstitutional on unadjudicated grounds. 160
Injunction will not lie to prohibit the enforcement of an ordinance
when a remedy exists at law.170 Even a void municipal ordinance
should not be restrained if its enforcement amounts to a mere
trespass. 171 The mere fact that compliance with an ordinance will
impose a heavy burden on plaintiff constitutes no ground for equitable relief by injunction. 72 Resort to the courts to enjoin enforcement of a municipal zoning ordinance is justified only when substantial property rights have been illegally or arbitrarily invaded and
municipal relief from unlawful injury has been denied. 17 3 In such
cases acquiescence by a municipality in an existing condition over a
long period of time may be taken into account in determining whether
74
a zoning ordinance is being arbitrarily enforced.'

Actions of Public Officials and Administrative Boards
Injunction cannot be used to control or review the proceedings or
judgments of a board, commission or commissioner, common law certiorari being the appropriate method of judicial review when there is
v. Winn & Lovett Grocery Co., 155 Fla. 318, 19 So.2d 867 (1944); Mizelle v.

Sweat, 130 Fla. 345, 177 So. 709 (1937).

' 68 Mayo v. Florida Grapefruit Growers' Protective Ass'n, 112 Fla. 117,
So. 25 (1933).
169 Cone v. King, 143 Fla. 323, 196 So. 697 (1940).
17oStocks v. Lee, 144 Fla. 627, 198 So. 211 (1940); see Egan v. Miami,
Fla. 465, 468, 178 So. 132, 133 (1938); Rawls v. Miami, 82 Fla. 65, 67, 89
351, 352 (1921); Orange City v. Thayer, 45 Fla. 502, 506, 34 So. 573,

151

130
So.
574

(1903).

17 1Egan v. Miami, 130 Fla. 465, 178 So. 132 (1938).
172 Ibid.; Rawls v. Miami, 82 Fla. 65, 89 So. 351 (1921).
173 Miami v. Perell, 52 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1951); DeCarlo v. West Miami, 49
So.2d 596 (Fla. 1950); Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 10 So.2d 307 (1912);
Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364 (1941); Snedigan
v. Keefer, 131 Fla. 191, 179 So. 421 (1938).
174 Miami v. Lithgow, 152 Fla. 394, 12 So.2d 380 (1943); Miami Beach v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 141 Fla. 642, 194 So. 236 (1940).
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no other prescribed method. 175 Yet illegal action taken by state
officials may be enjoined when the ordinary remedies afforded by
courts of law are inadequate. 176 Normally the public by its authorized
officers must institute proceedings to prevent an unlawful act by a
public official. If, however, a private person is threatened with or
suffers some public or special damage to his individual interests
distinct from that suffered by every other inhabitant, and can also
bring his case under some acknowledged head of equity jurisdiction,
he may use injunction to prevent the act.177 In certain situations a
citizen-taxpayer, even though he has no special interest, can bring
suit to enjoin acts of public officials. For example, he can enjoin the
illegal creation of a debt which he, in common with other property
owners and taxpayers, would be compelled to pay, 178 the execution
of illegal contracts involving payments from a public fund to which
he is a contributor, 1 79 and an unauthorized expenditure of public
18 0
money.
Although acts of a ministerial character will be freely enjoined
upon a proper state of facts, courts of equity rarely restrain or control
the exercise of discretionary powers vested in municipal officers under
the police power. To do the latter would amount to an assumption
by the court of the powers delegated only to the municipal corporation or its officers. The court never does so unless it clearly appears
that the officers are unlawfully abusing and will probably continue to
abuse the discretion reposed in them. The act to be enjoined may
grow out of action under an invalid statute, misconception of the law,
fraud, malice, bad faith, or unfair dealing. The absence of an adeat law must be established here, as in other suits for
quate remedy
8
'
injunction.'
175Vocelle v. Maleszewsld, 160 Fla. 291, 34 So.2d 486 (1948); Ruff v.
Fisher, 115 Fla. 247, 155 So. 642 (1934).
176
Coen v. Lee, 116 Fla. 215, 156 So. 747 (1934); Sparkman v. County Budget
Comm'n, 103 Fla. 242, 187 So. 809 (1931); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Railroad
Comm'rs, 63 Fla. 491, 58 So. 543 (1912).
"'"Metropolis Pub. Co. v. Miami, 100 Fla. 784, 129 So. 913 (1930); Rickman
v. Whitehurst, 78 Fla. 152, 74 So. 205 (1917).
17SCrawford v. Gilcirist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963 (1912); Peck v. Spencer,
26 Fla. 23, 7 So. 642 (1890).
179Hathaway v. Munroe, 97 Fla. 28, 119 So. 149 (1929).
'S 0 Thursby v. Stewart, 103 Fla. 990, 188 So. 742 (1931); Whither v. Woodruff, 68 Fla. 465, 67 So. 110 (1914); Anderson v. Fuller, 51 Fla. 380, 41 So.
684 (1906).
'SlJacksonville v. Wilson, 157 Fla. 888, 27 So.2d 108 (1946).
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Criminal Acts
In the early days of organized English society the chancellor sometimes restrained the commission of criminal acts in cases where other
tribunals were too weak to protect the helpless against powerful
noblemen. Since the common law courts have become able to deal
with such matters, however, equity, subject to some qualifications,
has refused to restrain the commission of criminal acts. Equity will
likewise not exercise its power to enforce the criminal laws.' 82 In
such cases resort must be had to the criminal courts, which possess
ample power to punish the wrongdoer.
The law of Florida declares gambling houses to be public nuisances
that may be abated by injunction.' 83 In the leading case construing
this statute and passing upon its constitutionality the Court stated that
injunction can be made available by statute to suppress places in
which gambling is conducted. 8 4 The injunction operates against the
nuisance and hence is not conceded to be used to prevent an act that
is only illegal. The Court explained: 185
"Where there is legislation authorizing courts of equity to
enjoin acts constituting, and duly declared to be, a public
nuisance, which acts at the same time are declared to be
criminal, the best considered cases uphold the jurisdiction of
Courts of Equity to abate such nuisances by injunction. The
State possesses the undoubted right to prohibit gambling and
the keeping or operation of gaming places or devices, and we
do not doubt the authority of the State to declare that any place
kept and maintained for the purpose of gambling and the operation of gambling devices shall be deemed a public nuisance, and,
at the same time, to provide for the criminal prosecution of the
offenders. 'One is a proceeding against the property used for
forbidden purposes, while the other is for the punishment of
the offender. .. .'
lS2polk v. Polk, 41 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1949); Hagerty v. Coleman, 138 Fla.

868, 182 So. 776 (1988); see Maloney, Injunctive Law Enforcements: Leaven
or Secret Weapon, 1 MERCEH L. REv. 1 (1949).
18 3 FrL. STAT. §64.11 (1949).

184 Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bryan, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So.
801, (1927); accord, Lansky v. State ex rel. Gibbs, 145 Fla. 301, 199 So. 46
(1940).
8
1 5Id. at 437, 111 So. at 809.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 6
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FLORIDA

"... 'These two proceedings are entirely unlike. The latter
is conducted under the provisions of the criminal law, and deals
only with the person who has violated the law. The former is
governed by the rules which relate to property, and its only
connection with persons is through the property in which they
may be interested. The fact that keeping a nuisance is also a
crime does not deprive a court of equity of the power to abate
such nuisance."'
The pendency of a suit by a private citizen to enjoin operation of a
gambling house as a nuisance under the above statute does not preclude a criminal prosecution against the defendant for the same
offense.' 86 An injunction issued under the authority of this statute
that enjoins the operation of any game of chance within a county was
held to be an improper use of equity to18 7enjoin transgression of a
criminal law and not to abate a nuisance.
Elections
In jurisdictions recognizing distinct courts of law and equity, as in
Florida, the general rule is that an injunction will not issue for the
purpose of restraining the holding of an election or of controlling the
mode in which an election shall be held. An election is a political
matter, with which courts of equity are reluctant to interfere, 8 8 and
as to which in any event an adequate remedy, such as quo warranto,
exists at law. In this state the rule has been modified to the extent
of holding that, if prior to an election fraud and palpable violation of
the registration or election laws are about to take place and are
properly charged by an elector, he may have "injunction or such other
appropriate remedy as is available to him under the law."189 This
general reluctance may be explained on the ground that judicial interference in election controversies might result in the destruction of
popular government especially when the relief sought is to prevent
the holding of an election by the people and thereby to prevent the
18 (Coleman v. Greene, 186 Fla. 276, 186 So. 541 (1939).
' 87 Lansky v. State ex rel. Gibbs, 145 Fla. 301, 199 So. 46 (1940).
'BSJoughin v. Parks, 107 Fla. 833, 147 So. 278 (1983); see Note, 70 A.L.R.
733 (1931).
89
v. Parks, 107 Fla. 833, 143 So. 145 (1932); McGregor v. Burnett,
.
Joughin
105 FI. 447, 141 So. 599 (1932).
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free expression of popular will. This impelling judicial tendency to
leave unhampered our avenues of popular expression is no doubt of
sufficient cogency to support the rule as applied to general elections
recurring at stated intervals and required by statute to be held at
particular times and places. But the reason for the rule does not
logically apply to a number of special and extraordinary "nonpolitical" elections. Recall elections, for example, can be held only
when specific statutory authority has been granted and substantially
pursued. Interference with such unusual elections by injunction or
otherwise will have no other effect than to delay a particular recall
effort until such time as the court is satisfied that the election proceedings properly comply with the applicable statute. A suit will
therefore be entertained to enjoin the holding of a recall election
when the ground is that the provisions of the statute authorizing the
election are not being complied with and no other plain, complete,
and adequate remedy at law exists for the protection of the rights of
the plaintiff.190 Likewise, in other cases not involving the people's
right to choose elective officials to govern themselves, a court of
equity may in a clear case enjoin the holding of the election when
asserted vested contract or property rights can be more effectually
protected by restraining in advance a threatened unlawful election. 191
Examples of such instances occur in elections involving improper use
193
of funds,' 92 or a change in a contract with a public utility.
Courts of equity do not have general jurisdiction to order elections
to be held in the absence of valid statutory authority, but they do
have power to require that to be done which in law should be done.
Consequently any and all appropriate judicial writs, including injunction, are available to electors and officeholders to prevent violations
of statutes enacted for the purpose of regulating and securing the
expression of popular will in elections in the absence of laches,
94
waiver, or estoppel.'
Labor Problems
It is now firmly established under federal and state decisions that
' 9 0 Flatt v. Ross, 112 Fla. 596, 150 So. 716 (1933); State ex rel. Landis v.
Tedder, 106 Fla. 140, 143 So. 148 (1932).

191Duval County v. Jennings, 121 Fla. 584, 164 So. 356 (1935).
92
- Cincinnati v. Hillenbrand, 103 Ohio St. 286, 133 N.E. 556 (1921).

19 3Mobile v. Mobile Elec. Co., 203 Ala. 574, 84 So. 816 (1919).
194Williams v. Keyes, 135 Fla. 769, 186 So. 250 (1938).
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picketing is not per se unlawful but will be enjoined if done for an
unlawful purpose or accompanied by threats, force, violence, coercion,
or intimidation.' 95 It was recently held that picketing buildings in
which an employer had contracted to install plumbing equipment for
the sole purpose of compelling the employer to enter into a closed
shop agreement was picketing for an unlawful object and was
190
properly enjoined even though the picketing was peaceful.
VI. PROCEDURE

Bill of Complaint and Affidavits
Section 64.01, Florida Statutes 1949, provides:
"No writ of injunction shall be granted until a bill praying therefor shall have been filed, except in the special cases in which,
and for the special causes for which such writs are authorized
in the courts of the United States exercising equity jurisdiction."
Without doubt more injunctions fail because of insufficient allegations in the bill of complaint than for any other reason. The long and
unyielding insistence on compliance with the strict requirements relating to the bill is understood when it is realized that in many
applications for injunction these allegations constitute the court's only
9
source of information in determining the propriety of the grant.' '
Since an application for injunction is made in chancery, the first
requirement of'a bill of complaint is that it state a cause for equitable
relief. A bill without equity is always subject to attack on motion to
dismiss, and no restraining order or temporary injunction should be
granted thereon. If already granted, the injunction should be dis198
On an applicasolved as soon as possible and the bill dismissed.
5
19 Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laundry, 41 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1949); see

Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328 (1932) (enjoining picketing of theatre).
196Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
197See note 7 supra.
198 Blume v. Giles, 143 Fla. 615, 197 So. 344 (1940); Tarpon Springs v.
Chrysostomides, 108 Fla. 500, 146 So. 845 (1933); State ex rel. Knott v.
Willmer, 102 Fla. 64, 135 So. 859 (1931); B. L. E. Realty Corp. v. Mary
Williams Co. 101 Fla. 254, 134 So. 47 (1931); St. Johns County v. Triay, 73
Fla. 289, 74 So. 405 (1917); Builder's Supply Co. v. Acton, 56 Fla. 756, 47
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tion for an injunction the chancellor may go into the merits as disclosed by the bill and may dismiss it for lack of equity before answer
is filed.1 99 Moreover, relief cannot be granted for matters not charged
in the bill. The complainant must stand on the case made by his bill
and cannot have advantage of material matter not put in issue by it,
even though such matters be shown by other pleadings or the
evidence. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff to allege clearly and
definitely every fact necessary to entitle him to relief; and if he omits
essential facts or states facts that show he is not entitled to equitable
relief he must suffer the consequences. This principle applies to all
bills in equity but is especially applicable to those seeking injunction. 20 0 Of course, time should be allowed for amendment so as to
give plaintiff an opportunity, if he desires, to set forth facts that
201
entitle him to relief.
The Court has repeatedly held that not only must the allegations
of a bill of injunction be clear, direct, and positive, but they must
also be verified by an affidavit which must be direct and positive;
and, if any of the material allegations contained in the bill of complaint are stated on information and belief, there should be annexed
to and presented therewith an affidavit of the person or persons from
whom the information is derived positively averring that the facts
alleged upon information are true. 20 2 A bill verified on information
and belief, without any accompanying affidavit as to its truth from
the source of such information, is defective and subject to objection
and dissolution as a matter of course before answer. The only exception to this rule is that a preliminary injunction is sometimes
allowed upon allegations founded upon information and belief until,
under an order to show cause, a hearing can be had and better eviSo. 822 (1908).
199See note 216 infra.
20 0
American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Rader, 160 Fla. 700, 36 So.2d 270 (1948);
House v. Nash, 90 Fla. 123, 105 So. 266 (1925); Builder's Supply Co. v.

Acton, 56 Fla. 756, 47 So. 822 (1908); Weeks v. J. C. Turner Lumber Co.,
53 Fla. 793, 44 So. 173 (1907); Godwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So. 597
(1906); Johnson v. McKinnon, 45 Fla. 388, 34 So. 272 (1903); McKinney v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 26 Fla. 267, 4 So. 855 (1890).
20
Stonaris v. Certain Picketers, 46 So.2d 387 (Fla. 1950); McKinney v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 26 Fla. 267, 4 So. 855 (1890).
2 02
Trast Co. of Florida v. Crider, 102 Fla. 593, 136 So. 434 (1931); Drew
Lumber Co. v. Union Inv. Co., 66 Fla. 382, 63 So. 836 (1913); Godwin v.
Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So. 597 (1906).
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dence adduced. 20 3 An affidavit by the plaintiffs
solicitor is sufficient
20 4
if it is positive and direct as of knowledge.
A plaintiff seeking an injunction must allege not only definite facts
showing clear legal or equitable rights the invasion of which would
afford a basis for the relief sought, but also a well-grounded apprehension of immediate injury to that right. When no necessity is
shown for the protection of the right by an injunction, it will not be
granted. 20 5 Vague allegations of opinions or conclusions are not
sufficient, even though such allegations suggest equities which, if
properly pleaded, might under some circumstances authorize equit20
able relief. 6
When an injunction is sought on the ground of irreparable injury,
the bill should allege facts that will enable the court to determine
whether the injury will in actuality be irreparable- facts that show
the exact nature of the injury. A mere general allegation that the
injury will be irreparable is a legal conclusion or opinion of the
pleader and is not sufficient. When an application is made for a
temporary injunction without notice to the defendant, the allegations
in the bill are even more carefully examined than when the defendant
has been served with notice and given an opportunity to resist the
application. An allegation in the bill or an affidavit stating that
notice to the defendant will accelerate the injury apprehended is a
2 07
legal conclusion, not sufficient reason for dispensing with notice.
When the injury complained of is one arising from the right of
property in soil, such as continued trespasses amounting to a nuisance
or threatening irreparable injury, or trespasses to timbered lands
under Florida Statutes 1949, Section 64.08, plaintiff should set up his
title in terms clearly showing his ownership. 208 General allegations
of title to lands may be sufficient when they are not qualified or
203Cunningham v. Tucker, 14 Fla. 251 (1873).
204Ballard v. Eckman, 20 Fla. 661 (1884); Bowes v. Hoeg, 15 Fla. 403
(1876);
Coxetter v. Huertas, 14 Fla. 270 (1873).
205
House v. Nash, 90 Fla. 123, 105 So. 266 (1925); Crawford v. Bradford,
23 Fla. 404, 2 So. 782 (1887); Pensacola & G.R.R. v. Spratt, 12 Fla. 26, 91
Am. Dec. 747 (1867); see note 16 supra.
20
6American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Rader, 160 Fla. 700, 36 So.2d 270 (1948);
Stanton
v. Harris, 152 Fla. 786, 13 So.2d 17 (1943).
2 7
o Codwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So. 597 (1906).
208
Baker v. McKinney, 54 Fla. 495, 44 So. 944 (1907); Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Gibson, 43 Fla. 315, 31 So. 230 (1901); Sullivan v. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200
(1882).
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209
otherwise rendered insufficient by other allegations in the pleading.
An averment of possession is essential to a bill by one claiming the
legal title to land to enjoin a judicial sale upon the ground that the
sale would cast a cloud upon his title. 210If he is not in possession he
has a full and adequate remedy at law.
Every bill of complaint for injunction should, of course, contain a
prayer for relief.211 A temporary injunction must be specially prayed
for.21 2 When the prayer for injunction is broader than plaintiff's
right, relief may be denied altogether. 213 The better view would
but to grant such relief as
seem to be not to deny relief completely
21 4
under the circumstances is equitable.

Application for Temporary Injunction
To grant a temporary injunction two essential conditions must
prevail. The bill must allege facts that appear sufficient to constitute a cause of action or ground for injunction; and on the full
showing made from both sides it must appear in the light of circumto protect the legal rights of
stances that the injunction is necessary
2 15
the plaintiff pending the litigation.
It has been repeatedly held in Florida that on an application for a
temporary injunction the chancellor may consider the merits of the
bill, for the reason that an examination of a bill on its merits is the
primary means available to the court to determine whether ground
for injunction is stated.2 1 6 Holding this view, the Court has said that
it is not improper for the chancellor to consider and dispose of the
209Sinclair v. Hornsby, 61 Fla. 742, 55 So. 404 (1911).
21OBevill v. Smith, 25 Fla. 209, 6 So. 62 (1889).

211 Gaines v. Russ, 60 Fla. 317, 53 So. 118 (1910); Savage v. Parker, 53
Fla.2121002, 43 So. 507 (1907); Thompson v. Maxwell, 16 Fla. 773 (1878).
Gaines v. Russ, 60 Fla. 317, 53 So. 113 (1910); Savage v. Parker, 53 Fla.
1002, 43 So. 507 (1907).
213

McSween v. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd., 97 Fla. 749, 125 So. 704
(1927).
214Scully v. Webber, 158 Fla. 896, 80 So.2d 504 (1947).

215Thursby v. Stewart, 103 Fla. 990, 138 So. 742 (1981); McMullen v.
Pinellas County, 90 Fla. 398, 106 So. 73 (1925).
2 16
Thursby v. Stewart, 103 Fla. 990, 138 So. 742 (1931); McMullen v.
Pinellas County, 90 Fla. 398, 106 So. 73 (1925); McKinney v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 26 Fla. 267, 4 So. 855 (1890); Apalachicola v. Curtis, 9 Fla. 340,
79 Am. Dec. 284 (1861).
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main question on application for temporary injunction. 217 The Court
has indicated that it considers a temporary restraining order without
notice as summary in nature, entitling the party restrained to a speedy
218
determination of the issues raised.

A temporary injunction ordinarily continues under our practice for
the time fixed by the order granting it or, if no time is fixed, until the
2 19
It is not
hearing on the merits, unless it is sooner dissolved.
dissolved by the filing of an amended bill.22 0

A plaintiff has no right

to keep it extant indefinitely, however, without taking steps to main2 21
tain his case by proof or to bring it to some final determination.
As a general rule a second application for an injunction, when
based upon the same evidence or upon evidence that should have
been presented upon the first application, will be denied. Since,
however, this is a matter in which judicial discretion should be exercised, it is not error to grant a second application if a clear case is
2 22
presented.
Notice of Application for Temporary Injunction
A duty involving care and caution is imposed upon the chancellor
to whom the application for temporary injunction is made. He must
protect and preserve the alleged rights of the plaintiff, but he must
also guard the rights of the defendant. The requirements of direct,
clear, and positive allegations in the bill and a specific sworn affidavit
containing a statement of the material facts are but two safeguards
protecting a defendant. Much the best means of protecting a defendant is to give him notice, even if it be only a few hours - unless

the giving of it would be likely to defeat the purpose of the
application.
Equity Rule 73223 in effect requires notice or a proper showing to
dispense with notice. A temporary injunction without either is im217

McMullen v. Pinellas County, 90 Fla. 398, 106 So. 73 (1925).
21sStrong v. Clay, 47 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1950).
219
Scarlett v. Hicks, 13 Fla. 314 (1871).
220
Pedrick v. Vidal, 95 Fla. 952, 116 So. 857 (1928).
221
Perry v. Wittich, 37 Fla. 237, 20 So. 238 (1896).
222
Thursby v. Stewart, 103 Fla. 990, 138 So. 742 (1931).
228
Same as FLA. STAT. §63.73 (1949). FLA. STAT. §64.12 (1949) provides
that at least three days' notice in writing must be given the defendant of the
time and place of application for temporary injunction to abate a nuisance
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providently and erroneously granted. 224 A statement in the bill or
affidavit asserting simply the legal conclusion that "notice to the
defendant of the application for injunction will accelerate the injury
apprehended" is not sufficient. Allegations of a sworn bill or
accompanying affidavit must state facts showing how and why the
giving of notice will accelerate or precipitate the injury. From these
facts the court can determine for itself whether the giving of notice
will produce or is likely to produce such a result. 225 Obviously the

allegations in such bill or affidavit should be more closely scanned
than when notice is given and defendant resists the application. The
court should be satisfied that there is a clear case of urgent necessity
226
in which irreparable mischief will be produced if relief is denied.
If the injury threatened is the making of a judicial sale on legal sale
day as advertised by the sheriff, notice to the defendant is required
because an affidavit that such notice would accelerate the injury
apprehended has no application to such a case. 227 As previously
noted, 228 by virtue of statute no substitute for notice is available in a
suit to stay proceedings at law.
The statute providing for injunction without bond requires as a
prerequisite for such remedy that the chancellor receive from both
parties evidence as to the truth of the statements in the bill and
affidavit. 229 It would seem, therefore, that under the existing
statutes no injunction should issue without notice and without bond.
Bond
Another and an effective safeguard is to require the plaintiff to
post a bond of indemnity. Although three Florida statutes deal with
thereunder.
224

American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Rader, 160 Fla. 700, 36 So.2d 270
(1948); Drew Lumber Co. v. Union Inv. Co., 66 Fla. 382, 63 So. 836 (1913).
225
Dixie Music Co. v. Pike, 135 Fla. 671, 185 So. 441 (1938); Thursby v.

Stewart, 103 Fla. 990, 138 So. 742 (1931); Godwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So.
597 (1906).
226
Dixie Music Co. v. Pike, 135 Fla. 671, 185 So. 441 (1938); Gillespie v.
Chapline, 59 Fla. 500, 52 So. 722 (1910); Godwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41
So. 597 (1906).
22 7
Richardson v. Kittlewell, 45 Fla. 551, 33 So. 984 (1903); Baird v. Ells-

worth Trust Co., 45 Fla. 187, 34 So. 565 (1903).
2 28
See note 98 supra.
22 9
FL_.

STAT.

§64.03 (1949).
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injunction bonds, 230 only the one relating to injunctions to stay pro-

ceedings at law requires a bond as a prerequisite to the injunction.
Nevertheless, it is well settled that a temporary injunction or restraining order should not be awarded without an indemnity bond
unless it is shown by the bill or affidavit that the plaintiff is unable
to give bond or other security and the procedure provided by Section
64.03, Florida Statutes 1949, is followed.2 31 This power to waive the
requirement of a bond should be exercised sparingly. The absence
of a special statute requiring injunction bonds in all cases affords no
occasion per se for a departure from the prevailing equity practice,
existing in Florida for many years, of so doing in cases in which by
injunction the complainant seeks to destroy, for the period of the
injunctions duration, valuable rights being claimed by the defendant.2 32 Our Court has taken the position that if a statute providing
the remedy of injunction makes no reference to a bond, a temporary
injunction without bond should not issue thereunder except on the
express conditions provided by the general statute relating to injunc233
tions without bond.

The courts of Florida are very frequently asked to issue injunctions
in the delicate situations produced by domestic discord. While the
writers have no detailed knowledge of the practice in the state outside
of the First Judicial Circuit, in that circuit the practice in marital
cases is to grant injunctions without notice freely and without requiring bond when sought to prevent violence by the husband against
the wife, to prevent the removal of children from the jurisdiction by
23

0
FLA. STAT. §64.04 (1949) relates only to injunctions by municipal corporations or taxing districts; §64.02 requires a bond in every case of injunction
to stay proceedings at law; §64.03 is general, providing that when the complainant is unable to give bond or other security the chancellor shall receive from
both parties evidence of the truth or falsity of the statement of the bill and of
the accompanying affidavit, and if they shall appear to be true shall grant process
without requiring security.
23 1
Dixie Music Co. v. Pike, 135 Fla. 671, 185 So. 441 (1938); Merryman

v. Southern Tours, Inc., 120 Fla. 440, 162 So. 897 (1985).

The Court has

repeatedly disapproved the practice of granting restraining orders on condition

of posting the required bond at a future date and has held that it is contrary
to the provisions and policy of FLA. STAT. §64.03 (1949), Ginsberg v. Daytona
Beach, 103 Fla. 168, 137 So. 253 (1931); Gillespie v. Chapline, 59 Fla. 500,
52 So. 722 (1910); Hall v. Home, 52 Fla. 510, 42 So. 383 (1906); Stockton v.
Harmon,
32 Fla. 312, 13 So. 833 (1893).
232
Merryman v. Southern Tours, Inc., 120 Fla. 440, 162 So. 897 (1935).
2aalbid.
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one spouse or the other, to preserve the status quo as to marital
accumulations of property pendente lite, 234 and kindred related
acts.23 5 This is especially true when the wife seeks relief against the
husband. The opposing party, in cases in which injunctions have
been granted, has in no instance seriously contended that the court
was acting arbitrarily or without authority or justification in so doing.
Since the husband owes the wife the duty of support and is usually
answerable for obligations incurred by her, it seems so wholly illogical
to require her to give indemnity to her husband that the court has
disregarded the technical requirements of the statute in such cases.
The statute requiring bond as a condition precedent to the issuance
of an injunction to stay proceedings at law specifically states what the
condition of the required bond must be. In cases not within that
statute the law is not so clear. In 1946 the Supreme Court of Florida
said that the plaintiff ". . . should be required to give a good and
sufficient bond in such an amount and according to such terms or
conditions as will fully indemnify the petitioner here (defendant
below) for all costs and damages which he may sustain in the event
236
respondent does not finally prevail."
In a very old case 237 the Court said that upon the dissolution of
an injunction and the failure of the obligors to perform the conditions
of the injunction bond, the bond became forfeited and a right of
action accrued for the penalty. In an action at law upon the bond
judgment may be had for the penalty and for such damages as the
jury may assess. The complaint in such an action must set forth the
cost, damages, or expenses incurred by reason of the improper suing
out of the injunction or it will be fatally defective..2 3 8 It is no defense
that the condition of the bond is broader than the terms required by
the injunction order. 23 9 A statute effective June 11, 1951,240 eliminates the necessity for a separate action at law in such situations.
The circuit judge is now empowered upon dissolution of an injunc234

FLA. STAT. §65.11 (1949) provides that ". . . when the husband is about
to remove himself or his property out of the state, or fraudulently convey or
conceal it, the court may award a ne exeat or injunction against him or his
property, and make such order or decree as will secure the wife's alimony to her."
235
See Note, 164 A.L.R. 321 (1946).
23 6
Hart v. Kapnias, 157 Fla. 846, 848, 27 So.2d 145, 146 (1946).
237
Tallahassee R.R. v. Hayward, 4 Fla. 411 (1852).
238
Royal Phosphate Co. v. Van Ness, 58 Fla. 185, 43 So. 916 (1907).
239
Sewell v. Huffstetler, 83 Fla. 629, 93 So. 162 (1922).
240
Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26,916.
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tion to hear the evidence and assess the damages to which the
defendant may be entitled under the bond, provided neither party
requests a jury trial for damages in the bill of complaint, the answer,
or the motion to dissolve.
Attorneys' fees, among other items of damages, are allowable upon
dissolution of an injunction, whether dissolved upon interlocutory or
final hearing. 241 In Wittich v. O'Neal,242 the earliest Florida case
touching on this subject, the Court said at page 598:
"The case at bar is one in which the main suit was pending; a
temporary injunction was issued and dissolved on the application of the plaintiff in this suit before a determination of the
main suit. In such a case the temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, Unlike the usual course of law, which 'proceeds upon inquiry and only condemns after a hearing,' it is
often ex parte and condemns temporarily before a hearing. It
seems just and right that where a party asks the interposition of
the power of the courts, in advance of a trial of the merits of the
cause, to deprive the defendant of some right or privilege
claimed by him, even though temporarily, that if on investigation it is found that the plaintiff has no just right either in the
law or the facts to justify him in asking and obtaining from the
court such a harsh and drastic exercise of its authority, that he
should indemnify the defendant in the language of his bond for
'all damages he might sustain,' and that reasonable counsel fees
necessary to the recovering of such injunction are properly a
part of his damage."
In another early case the bond, following substantially the language
of the statute, was conditioned ". . . to pay 'all costs, losses and
charges, damages and expenses' [sustained] 'by reason of said injunction . . . being dissolved or the said bill dismissed on final
hearing.' ,2 43 The Court held that while there was no motion to dissolve

the injunction, which was granted on full hearing and then dissolved
and the bill dismissed on final hearing, the condition of the bond and
the statute covered the item of attorneys' fees.
24 1

National Surety Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 103 Fla. 738, 138 So. 24

(1931); see Note, 164 A.L.R. 1088 (1946).
24222 Fla. 592 (1886).
243

Bailey v. Haymans, 73 Fla. 1191, 1192, 76 So., 135 (1917).
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In a later case concerning an injunction bond conditioned that if
the "injunction be dissolved and the bill be dismissed" the plaintiffs
should pay all costs and damages, it appeared that the motion to
dissolve the injunction on interlocutory hearing was denied, but on
final hearing it was dissolved and the bill dismissed. Defendant
demurred to the declaration upon the ground that, since the declaration affirmatively showed that the motion to dissolve was denied, the
subsequent dissolution of the injunction and dismissal of the bill did
not entitle the plaintiff to demand any damages. The Court rejected
this contention and held that under the statute and the condition of
the bond it was immaterial whether the dissolution of the injunction
occurred upon motion or upon final hearing, 244 The Court further
held that dissolution of an injunction upon the merits operates as an
adjudication that it was improperly issued.
The latest decision coming from our Court on the subject of
attorneys' fees arose out of litigation upon the bond given by plaintiff
in an application for the appointment of a receiver. In that case
complainants alleged mismanagement, misappropriation of funds, and
various other misconduct on the part of defendants. The bill prayed
for an accounting, reimbursement of funds, and the appointment of a
receiver. A receiver was appointed upon the posting of a bond conditioned to pay the company for loss or damage if upon further hearing
it was determined that appointment of a receiver was not warranted.
There was no separate hearing on the motion to dismiss the receiver,
which was considered and disposed of on the final hearing on the
merits. Upon such hearing it was decreed that the appointment of a
receiver was not warranted, and the bill was dismissed. In a suit
upon the bond for damages sustained, claim was made for attorneys'
fees resulting from the defense on the merits. The Court analogized
the situation to bonds in injunction cases and held that attorneys' fees
2 45
could be recovered, saying:
"... we hold that where, as here, the receivership was inseparable from relief sought by the bill and the receivership was
the indispensable medium through and by which to receive the
relief prayed, the defendant can recover as damages in a suit on
the bond given . . . such proportion of attorney's fees as were
24 4
24 5

Sewell v. Huffstetler, 83 Fla. 629, 93 So. 162 (1922).
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Utility Battery Mfg. Co., 122 Fla. 718,

725, 166 So. 856, 859 (1985).
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reasonably and properly incurred by the defendant in procuring
a decree discharging the receiver, although such decree also
disposes of the case on its merits."
Order for Injunction
It has become common practice in Florida to consider the order of
the court for an injunction as the injunction itself. There may be
danger in this assumption. Correctly, injunction is a writ issuing by
the order and under the seal of the court.
In some states the writ of injunction has been abolished by statute,
and an injunction is merely an order rather than a writ. In at least
one state the same result has been reached by the development of the
practice in the state.240 Since our statutes refer to a "writ of injunction,"247 it is quite obvious that the writ has not been abolished by
statute. Whether it is to be considered abolished by disuse is a
question that should be considered by the careful lawyer. No Florida
cases bear directly upon the question of the form of the injunction
in so far as it may be considered process as distinguished from an
order or decree of the court. The distinction might become important
to the executive officer of the court, since his conduct while serving
process is protected, while the service by him of an unofficial document, such as a certified copy of the order or decree, might result in
complications if met with resistance. The better practice is to furnish
the officer with a writ issued by the clerk under the seal of the court,
following the language of the order or decree of the court, rather than
to permit him to serve only a copy of the order or decree.
Modification and Dissolution of Temporary Injunction
If modification is necessary to the equitable operation of an order
granting a temporary injunction, the circuit court may apply the
remedy when such order is not pending on appeal. If an appeal is
pending the appellate court may grant leave to apply to the circuit
24

GThe court in Ellis v. Commander, 26 S.C. 93, 95, 20 S.C. Eq. 188, 192
(1847) said: "The distinction between the writ of injunction, strictly so called,
and an order in the nature of an injunction, has been disregarded in practice,
and such orders, although not enforced by writ of injunction, have long since
indiscriminately
obtained the name of injunctions."
247
FLA.STAT. c. 64 (1949).
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court for appropriate modification. 248
A temporary injunction may be merged in or dissolved by the final
decree 24 9 and may also be attacked while the suit is pending, even
before answer is filed. The latter is done by motion to dissolve
.. .either before or after answer filed, on due notice being previously given to the opposite party or his solicitor .... ."250 Upon
such a motion to dissolve, as well as upon the original application for
the injunction, either party has the right to introduce evidence, and
the chancellor will grant, dissolve, or continue the order, or may
require security, according to the weight of the evidence.2 5 1 The
burden of proof in this instance is on the defendant, 252 and it is error
to dissolve an injunction without notice to the plaintiff. 253 As the
case is not before it for final hearing, the court should not dismiss
the bill upon the hearing on a motion to dissolve- unless, of course,
the bill lacks equity-254 but only upon a final hearing, after an
opportunity has been given the parties to make up issues and take
testimony. 2 55 Overruling a motion to dissolve an injunction does not
preclude the court from afterward dissolving the injunction and
dismissing the bill. 256 An order of the court denying, granting,
dissolving, or refusing to dissolve a temporary injunction but not dismissing the bill should be treated as interlocutory and not final in its
nature and should be reviewed on interlocutory certiorari under
25 7
Supreme Court Rule 34 and not on appeal.
If a temporary injunction has been granted and then dissolved but
the bill remains on file and the cause is still within the control of the
court, it is not error on rehearing for the court to vacate that order
24

8Sharp v. Bussey, 129 Fla. 775, 176 So. 763 (1937).
Smnith v. Housing Authority, 148 Fla. 195, 3 So.2d 880 (1941); Schultz v.
Freeland, 107 Fla. 286, 145 So. 257 (1932).
24 9

25 0
25 1

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§64.05 (1949).

§64.06 (1949); Ogden v. Baile, 69 Fla. 458, 68 So. 671
(1915); Builders Supply Co. v. Acton, 56 Fla. 756, 47 So. 822 (1908); Baya
v. Lake City, 44 Fla. 491, 33 So. 400 (1902).
2 2
0Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932).
5
3McAdow v. Wachob, 45 Fla. 482, 33 So. 702 (1903).
25 4
See note 198 supra.
2 5
5 Tampa Northern RR. v. Tampa, 91 Fla. 241, 107 So. 364 (1926); Richardson v. Kittlewell, 45 Fla. 551, 33 So. 984 (1903); Baya v. Lake City, 44
Fla. 491, 33 So. 400 (1902).
256
See Sewell v. Huffstetler, 83 Fla. 629, 93 So. 162 (1922).
257
Weiss v. Marcus, 160 Fla. 283, 34 So.2d 550 (1948); Stephens v. Stickel,
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and reinstate the injunction without a refiling of the bill.258 The
reversal of an order dissolving an injunction reinstates the injunction
and in effect declares the acts enjoined to be unauthorized and
2 59
illegal.

Answer
The discretionary action of the chancellor in continuing or discontinuing the injunction must be governed by the weight and legal
effect of the evidence presented on hearing.26 0 Normally, however,
when the defendant to a bill for injunction files an answer that is
fully responsive to the bill and denies all the equities asserted by the
plaintiff, a temporary injunction granted prior to the answer will be
dissolved. 26 ' When the sworn answer of the defendant positively
denies the allegations of the bill and also contains responsive averments sufficient, if sustained, to defeat the injunction, a motion to
dissolve, heard by consent solely on the bill and answer, should be
granted.2 612 If, however, the answer does not negative beyond reasonable doubt the equity of the bill, the court should continue the injunction until final hearing. 263 Many cases can be found in which the
chancellor thought it best under the circumstances that the injunction
continue. 26 4 Delay and acquiescence of the enjoined defendant
prevents an application for dissolution by him only if the delay has
so changed the status of the parties that subsequent dissolution of the
injunction would injuriously and inequitably affect the plaintiff or
permit the defendant to exercise some inequitable or unfair ad265
vantage acquired by reason of his acquiescence and delay.
146 Fla. 104, 200 So. 896 (1941).
258

259

Peck v. Spencer, 26 Fla. 23, 7 So. 642 (1890).

Martin County v. Hansen, 111 Fla. 40, 149 So. 616 (1938).

260

Davis v. Wilson, 139 Fla. 698, 190 So. 716 (1939); Dade Enterprises,
Inc. v. Wometco Theatres, Inc., 119 Fla. 70, 160 So. 209 (1935); Godwin v.
Phifer, 51 Fla. 441, 41 So. 597 (1906); Campell v. White, 39 Fla. 745, 23 So.
555 (1897).
26 1
Gillespie v. Chapline, 59 Fla. 500, 52 So. 722 (1910); Shaw v. Palmer,
54 Fla. 490, 44 So. 953 (1907); Fuller v. Cason, 26 Fla. 476, 7 So. 870 (1890).

262Robbins v. White, 52 Fla. 613, 42 So. 841 (1907).
263
Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932).
264
E.g., Hayden v. Thrasher, 20 Fla. 715 (1884); Linton v. Denham, 6 Fla.
533265(1856).
Perry v. Wittich, 37 Fla. 237, 20 So. 238 (1896).
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Hearing on Bill and Answer
Ordinarily, upon hearing on bill and answer the only matters to be
considered by the chancellor are the plaintiff's bill and the defendant's
answer; and the facts found by the court in its preliminary order upon
a hearing for a temporary injunction are of no consequence. 266

Final Decree
A temporary injunction can be obtained upon mere notice or
without notice if the circumstances justify a summary remedy. No
final decree may be entered or permanent injunction issued, however,
without process, pleadings presenting the issues, and proof relevant
to them, unless these formalities are waived by stipulation, appearance, or otherwise. 2117 The acts or things enjoined should be specified
in the decree with sufficient definiteness and certainty to inform a
defendant bound by the decree of what he must refrain from doing. 26 8
Further, an injunction order should never be broader than is necessary
to secure to the injured party the full relief warranted by the particular facts of the case. 269 Generally speaking, an order that
permanently restrains a defendant from "resuming, continuing or
repeating the acts complained of in the bill of complaint," without
particularization of the specific acts enjoined, violates the principles
stated. This rule is applied especially where the bill charges the
commission of many different and varied acts and activities some of
which may be perfectly permissible and proper. 27 0

Modification of Final Decree
A final decree of injunction continues the life of the equity proceeding for such other relief as the court may in good conscience
grant under the law. Unless otherwise provided by its terms, the
injunction will remain in force so long as the court believes that the
protection that it affords is necessary to complainant's rights or until
266

2

Weiss v. Marcus, 160 Fla. 283, 34 So.2d 550 (1948).

67Sith v. Housing Authority, 148 Fla. 195, 3 So.2d 880 (1941).

268

Henderson v. Coleman, 150 Fla. 185, 7 So.2d 117 (1942); Palm Corp. v.
Walters, 148 Fla. 527, 4 So.2d 696 (1941); see note 286 infra.
269
Seaboard Rendering Co. v. Conlon, 152 Fla. 723, 12 So.2d 882 (1943).
2 0
7 Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laundry, 41 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1949).
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conditions demand a modification of that protection or its entire
removal. The decree itself may reserve to the court the right of
modification. Even in the absence of such a reservation, the court
that renders a decree for permanent or perpetual injunction has an
inherent right to open or modify the decree at any time that circumstances are shown to have changed so as to make it just and
equitable to do so. 2 7 1 Since an injunction order or decree does not
create a right, its modification cannot be considered an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process.
As regards the causes or occasions that may call for the modification or suspension of a permanent injunction, the rule seems to be
that the court in its discretion may permit or order such modification
or suspension as justice may require. This discretion is exercised
when the conditions motivating the issuance of the injunction change,
or when the applicable law, common or statutory, has in the meantime
27 2
been changed, modified, or extended.
Review
No supersedeas on an appeal from an interlocutory order or final
decree granting or dissolving an injunction shall have the effect of
suspending or modifying the order or decree appealed from unless
the Supreme Court or a justice thereof shall make an order for
2 73
suspension or modification.
As previously observed,2 74 an order of the court granting, denying,
dissolving, or continuing a temporary injunction but not finally determining the cause, is interlocutory in nature and may be reviewed
on interlocutory certiorari under Supreme Court Rule 34. On such a
review no question other than the propriety of the order may be
presented or argued.2 7 5 When a preliminary injunction has been
improperly denied by the circuit court, the Supreme Court, with the
cause transferred to it by the interlocutory appeal, will, upon appel27

1Seaboard Rendering Co. v. Conlon, 152 Fla. 723, 12 So.2d 882 (1943);

Jackson Grain Co. v. Lee, 150 Fla. 232, 7 So.2d 143 (1942); 46 McEH. L. REV.

241 (1947).
272n Frink v. Orleans Corp., 159 Fla. 646, 32 So.2d 425 (1947), the Court
retained jurisdiction for future modifications.
expressly
2 73
FLA. STAT. §67.04, 67.05 (1949).
4
27 See note 257 supra.
275
Angelis v. Tarpon Springs Sponge Producers Ass'n, 111 Fla. 740, 149 So.
630 (1938).
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lant's application, issue its own constitutional injunctive writ in order
to make "complete" its jurisdiction over the controversy before it.2 76
The controversy is confined to the proposition of whether the appellant was entitled to have temporary injunctive relief as of the date
of the order of the chancellor below denying it. The constitutional
writ, when issued in this situation, is in its practical operation and
effect a supersedeas of the circuit court's order denying a temporary
injunction. Since this lower court order is negative in character, it
can be superseded by an appellate court only through an affirmative
order of its own. 2 7 The Court may, however, determine the merits
of the appeal without passing on the application for the constitutional
writ of injunction.
An appeal from an order dissolving an injunction does not of itself
reinstate the injunction. An order directing the appeal to operate as a
supersedeas, and a compliance with the terms of the order, does give
it such effect, although it does not have the effect of depriving
278
strangers to the litigation of intervening rights bona fide acquired.
So long as an appeal with supersedeas from an order granting an
injunction is pending, the power to enforce the injunction is
suspended.2 7 9 When supersedeas is awarded on an appeal, an injunc28 0
tion to control the operation of the super~edeas will not be awarded.
A reversal of an order refusing to dissolve an injunction dissolves
the injunction upon its merits, and the reversal constitutes an adjudication that it was improperly issued. 28 ' On the other hand, the
reversal of an order dissolving an injunction reinstates the injunction
and in effect declares the acts enjoined to be unauthorized and
282
illegal.
In an appeal from a final decree awarding a permanent injunction
27 6

The application may be made under FLA. CONST. Art. V, §5; see note
47 supra.
277
Tacker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 127 Fla. 248, 170 So. 458 (1936);

Anderson v. Tower Amusement Co., 118 Fla. 437, 159 So. 782, vacated, 118
Fla. 895, 160 So. 523 (1935); see Note, 93 A.L.R. 709, 715 (1934).
278
Smith v. Whitfield, 38 Fla. 211, 20 So. 1012 (1896); McMichael v. Eckman,
26 Fla. 43, 7 So. 365 (1890).
279
1owell v. Florida Land and Improvement Co., 41 Fla. 494, 26 So. 700
1899); McMichael v. Eckman, 26 Fla. 48, 7 So. 365 (1890).
280

Burns v. Sanderson, 13 Fla. 381 (1870).
National Surety Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 103 Fla. 738, 138 So. 24
(1931).
281

282

Martin County v. Hansen, 111 Fla. 40, 149 So. 616 (1933).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 6
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FLORIDA
the Supreme Court will not consider the contention that the temporary injunction issued at the beginning of the litigation was erroneously granted. Although the temporary injunction may have been
improperly granted in the first place, yet if it is permitted to stand
until final hearing it may not thereafter be questioned. 283

Enforcement of Injunction
After an injunction is issued two separate interests in its enforcement exist. One is on the part of the applicant, who desires to see
that the rights it was issued to protect are in fact protected. The
other is that of the court, vhich has an inherent interest in maintaining its authority. Therefore, the party obtaining the injunction
has a legal right to have it enforced by the court, and the chancellor
28 4
has both the power and the duty to see that it is not disregarded.
The punishment for violating an injunction is the same as for contempt, 285 and the court will not accept technical defenses. A strict
or narrow construction will not be placed on the terms of an injunction
for the purpose of permitting a defense by one charged with violating
it when it is plain that he must have known that it was the intention
of the court to restrain the acts done. This is true even though such
acts were not described in the injunction with complete particularity.
In cases of doubt it is the duty of the defendant to apply to the court
for such modification of the language of the injunctive order as will
2 6
remove any ambiguity.
If the court had jurisdiction to issue it, the fact that an injunction
or restraining order is merely erroneous, or was improvidently granted
or irregularly obtained, or the bill was without equity and subject to
dismissal for that reason, is no excuse for violating it.287 A party cited
for disobedience of an injunction is never allowed to allege as a
defense for his misconduct that the court erred in its judgment in
granting the injunction or in refusing to dissolve it. This rule applies
28

3Sinclair v. Hornsby, 61 Fla. 742, 55 So. 404 (1911); Caro v. Pensacola

City Co., 19 Fla. 766 (1883).
284
285

Seaboard A.L. Ry. v. Tampa Sou. R.R., 101 Fla. 468, 134 So. 529 (1931).

Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd., 134 Fla. 1,
18328So.
759 (1938).
0
liverside Bank v. Maxa, 45 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1950); Seaboard A.L. Ry. v.
Tampa Sou. R.R., 101 Fla. 468, 134 So. 529 (1931).
2 7

8 Seaboard A.L. Ry. v. Tampa Sou. R.R., 101 Fla. 468, 134 So. 529 (1931).
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with special force to a prosecution for contempt instituted for the
purpose of preserving property in statu quo in accordance with the
court's order. Furthermore, it is no defense to a contempt proceeding
for the breach of an injunction or supersedeas order that the breach
288
was committed under the advice of counsel.
A defense of failure of service is not permissible if in fact the
defendant had knowledge of the issuance of the injunction. In a
very early Florida case the Court said:2s9
"In the case of an injunction, if the defendant obtains knowledge of its contents and of its having issued, no matter how he
gets his information, he is as amenable to the law for the violation
of its mandate as if the writ had been regularly served upon him
by the proper officer of the Court."
The power of a court to maintain its authority extends beyond fine
and imprisonment. It may further require a defendant who has interfered with property in violation of an injunction to restore the
property to its former condition. The court may also alternatively
order the defendant to make restitution or be fined or imprisoned.
Damages awarded in such cases are limited to those actually sustained
by the aggrieved party. 290 The mere fact that on final decree the
bill of complaint is dismissed and the defendant adjudged to have
been entitled to a decree in his favor will not operate to discharge a
defendant who has violated an injunction pendente lite prior to such
dismissal. When an interlocutory injunction has been disregarded by
a defendant, it is the duty of the court to retain jurisdiction of the
cause for the purpose of vindicating its authority with respect to its
lawful orders. This is necessary not only to insure respect for the
288

Continental Nat. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Scott, 41 Fla. 421, 26 So. 726

(1899).
289

Thebaut v. Canova, 11 Fla. 143, 166 (1866). Some cases do not use
such broad language but require that notice of an injunction, to be suffcient,
must proceed from a source entitled to credit and must inform the defendant
clearly and plainly from what acts he must abstain. See, e.g., Cape May &

S.L.R.R. v. Johnson, 35 N.J. Eq. (8 Stew.) 422 (Ch. 1882); also the informative
English case of Seaward v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 545, holding that, although
only a party to an injunction may be liable in a civil case for contempt for
breach of the injunction, a third party can be punished for criminal contempt
if he knowingly aids, abets, or assists in the breach.
2
°Hanna v. Martin, 49 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1950).
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court's authority at all times but also for the reason that, even though a
bill be dismissed and an injunction issued thereon ordered dissolved
on final hearing by the circuit court, the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may be thereafter invoked to continue the injunction in force
by way of supersedeas pending appeal. An order made in an equity
suit discharging a defendant from punishment for violation of an
injunction procured by complainant to protect his rights pendente
lite is reviewable as an interlocutory order. If the Supreme Court
finds that the defendant was in fact guilty of the contempt, it will
direct the circuit court to vindicate its inherent authority to enforce
91
2
its orders and redress acts of disobedience.

2

9ISeaboard A.L. By. v. Tampa Sou. R.B., 101 Fla. 468, 134 So. 529 (1931).
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